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Banking crises have plagued countries around the world from Argentina to Zamnbia  over
the last two decades. In recent years, several papers have focused on identifying banking crisis
episodes and studying their causes.' However, until very recently, the importance of a sound
banking  sector for  monetary  policy  implementation  did  not  receive  much. attention.  Two
exceptions are the  recent  studies by Garcia-Herrero (1997) and  Lindgren, Gjarcia, and  Saal
(1996). Both studies describe some of the distortions and problems that banking crises can create
for the  assessment and implementation of monetary policy. They argue that  banking  crises
complicate the conduct of monetary policy because they destabilize money demnand  and money
multipliers,  they  diminish  the  effectiveness of  monetary  instruments,  and  they  affect  the
relationship between monetary indicators and prices. Ultimately, banking crises, they argue, may
reduce the government's ability to achieve its inflation objective.
Monetary indicators refer to variables that help explain the behavior of prices and are
monitored  by policy-makers to  guide them  in the  conduct of  monetary policy.  Also, these
variables are typically included in the empirical equations for prices. Monetary aggregates are
frequently used as monetary indicators.2 Central banks monitor the behavior and demand for
monetary aggregates because they are reputed to be useful in explaining the behavior of prices.
Furthermore, these variables are readily available to the monetary authorities at high frequencies,
and they are considered to be better measured than other indicators.
1 See Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996),  Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1997),  and Lingren,  Garcia, and
Saal  (1996).
2 Monetary  aggregates  have been  traditionally  used as targets  for the conduct  of monetary  policy  because
they  were thought  to have a tightly  controllable  and reliable  link  to prices.  Over  time financial  innovation
and other  factors  have  led central  banks  to abandon  the use of monetary  aggregates  as strict  targets for the
conduct of monetary policy. Instead, monetary aggregates  are increasingly  being used as monetary
indicators.
2Garcia-Herrero (1997) and  Lindgren et al. (1996) argue that,  because banking crises
destabilize the demand for money, they are likely to affect the relationship between prices and
monetary aggregates. Thus, they argue monetary authorities may benefit, in particular during
crises,  from  expanding the  set  of  indicators they  monitor  to  include  other  indicators  like
exchange rates,  interest rates, and stock prices. Though very informative, these studies  rely
heavily on  a descriptive approach rather than on a  systematic econometric evaluation of the
problems that banking crises may bring. 3
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the monetary effects of banking crises. We
research two issues. First, we evaluate the claim that money demand stability is threatened by the
occurrence of banking crises. Secondly, we analyze the relationship between monetary indicators
and prices and, in particular, we test whether crises cause a structural break in this relationship.
The  study  focuses  on  the  following country and  crises  episodes:  Chile  (1981-87),
Colombia (1982-1988), Denmark (1987-1992), Japan (1992-present), Kenya (1985-1989, 1992-
1995), Malaysia (1985-1988), and Uruguay (198 1-1985).4' These countries were chosen in order
to obtain a geographically representative sample of countries that experienced banking problems
over the last two decades. 6
3  Garcia-Herrero  (1997) conducts a  Johansen-type  cointegration  analysis to  study long-run money
demand  stability,  but she warns  that her analysis  is incomplete  and that her sample  is too short.  Lindgren,
Garcia,  and Saal  (1996)  cite evidence  found  by Balifno  and Sudararajan  (1991)  that broad money  demand
intercepts  and interest elasticities  change during banking  crises in Argentina,  Chile, Philippines,  Spain,
and Uruguay.  However,  Balifio  and Sudararajan's  analysis  does  not contemplate  issues like cointegration
and error correction  modeling,  so it is unclear  whether  the equations  they base their results on are well
specified.
4 The dates in parentheses  correspond  to the periods identified  by Caprio and Kinglebiel (1996) and
Lindgren,  Garcia,  and Saal  (1996)  as periods  of banking  crises.
5 Table A.  1 in the appendix  contains  information  on the causes,  extent,  and consequences  of the crises  we
focus  on.
6 Though  we started  our investigation  with a sample  of 17 countries  that experienced  crises over the last
two decades,  data limitations  reduced  the number of countries  included in the final analysis  to the 7
mentioned  above.
3In our empirical estimations, we use cointegration analysis and error correction modeling
to find appropriate dynamic specifications for money and prices in each of the countries under
study. Parameter constancy tests on the estimated money demand equations help us evaluate the
hypothesis that money becomes unstable during periods of crisis. We focus on broad money
since the demand for narrow money is more likely to be affected by issues such as financial
innovation and deregulation, events that can themselves lead to instability. Finally, aside from
examining which variables are significant indicators of the behavior of prices, we also perform
parameter constarncy  tests  to  determine whether crises bring  about a  structural break in  the
relationship between prices and monetary indicators.
Overall, this paper does not find any systemic evidence that banking crises cause money
demand instability. Regarding the determinants of prices, we find that money, exchange rates,
foreign prices, and domestic interest rates are significant indicators of price behavior. Finally, the
results do not support the notion that the relationship between monetary indicators and prices
undergoes a structural break during these episodes. However, for three out of the seven countries
in this study, there is evidence of variance instability in the price equations as a result of banking
crises.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the relevant
literature. Section III outlines the empirical methodology used in this paper. Section IV presents
the empirical results. Finally, section V concludes.
II - Literature Review
A number of papers have studied the demand for money and the determinants of inflation
in the countries included in this paper. Table A.2 in the appendix summarizes most of these
4papers.  These studies help  guide the construction of the money demand  and price/inflation
specifications. Wherever possible and appropriate, we try to use the same measures of the "own"
and "outside" rates of money for each country and to include most of the variables found to be
significant in previous studies. 7 However, the majority of these papers cover different sample
than we do, and also they do not explicitly examine the impact of banking crises on the stability
of money demand.
The modeling and empirical approach used to  estimate the demand for money in this
study resembles that of Baba, Hendry, and Starr (1992), Ericsson, Hendry, and Prestwich (1998),
and  Ericsson  and  Sharma (1998).  These papers  focus  on  different  countries  and  are  not
concerned with the impact of banking crises on money demand. However, we  follow these
papers in their treatment of issues like cointegration, error correction modeling, and parameter
constancy.
There is a vast empirical literature on the "information content" (i.e., ability to explain
prices) of monetary indicators that is related to the analysis conducted in this paper. 8 Most of
these  studies  evaluate the  information content  of monetary  indicators  by  estimating  vector
autoregressive models (VARs) of prices, monetary aggregates, and other potential monetary
indicators and by conducting F-exclusion tests to determine the marginal explanatory power of
each indicator in explaining prices. This literature has mostly focused on the case of the U.S. and
other developed  countries. 9 Furthermore, to  our  knowledge, the  existing  literature  has  not
7 The "own"  return on money (M2  in this paper)  typically  refers  to the average  rate on deposits  included
in M2. The "outside"  rate of money  refers to the average  rate on some alternative  asset not included in
M2 (typically  T-bills  or government  bonds).
8  See Baumgartner  and Ramaswamy  (1996),  Baumgartner,  Ramaswamy,  Zettergren  (1997), Caramazza
and Slawner  (1991),  Davis and Henry (1994),  Friedman  and Kuttner  (1992),  Hamann  (1993),  Hostland,
Poloz, and Storer (1987), Mahdavi  and Zhou (1997), Sims (1980), Stock and Watson (1989), among
others.
9 Hannan  (1993)  is an exception.  This study  examines  the relationship  between  money,  output,  and prices
5empirically analyzed the  impact of  banking crises on  the  relationship between  prices  and
indicators.
The problem with the studies that focus primarily on the information content of monetary
indicators is  that changes in  their  explanatory power may be  caused by  increases  in  their
volatility  or noisiness over certain samples. Also, changes in the  degrees of freedom  in the
estimation of the price equation can also affect the results. For example, a preliminary analysis
we  conducted  indicates that  the  explanatory power of  most  monetary  indicators,  including
money, drops during crisis periods, relative to tranquil periods.1 0 However, the lack of statistical
significance of certain variables may very well be due to the loss of degrees of freedom over the
much shorter crisis periods.
This paper improves and adapts the methodology on the information content of monetary
indicators described above, in order to study the impact of banking crises on the relationship
between prices and indicators. Instead of focusing on examining the explanatory power of certain
variables over different samples, this paper tests for potential structural breaks in the relationship
between prices and monetary indicators. Structural stability is a more relevant matter for policy-
makers than the issue of whether a given variable happens to be statistically significant over a
particular sample. As long as the pre-crisis price equation remains stable over the crisis periods,
policy-makers can continue to use this formulation to model prices.
This study also pays substantial attention to the issue of cointegration (i.e., the potential
long-run relationship between prices and monetary indicators), which has been ignored by most
studies on the information content of monetary indicators. Finally, aside from modeling prices as
a function of domestic monetary and financial variables only (as most studies do), following De
in a group  of Pacific  Basin  countries  that underwent  a process  of financial  liberalization  during  the 1  980s.
'° Results are  available  upon request.
6Brouwer and Ericsson (1998) and Juselius (1992), we also control for the potential impact of
wages, unemployment, and external factors on prices.
III - Empirical Methodology and Data
To examine the monetary impact of banking crises, we estimate dynamic money demand
and price/inflation equations using monthly data for each country for the period 1975-1998."
The purpose of  estimating these equations is twofold. First, we  want to  determine whether
money demand becomes unstable during banking crises. Secondly, we want  to test  whether
crises cause a structural break in the relationship between monetary indicators and prices.
A number  of  steps are involved  in the  empirical  analysis and testing  of  the  issues
discussed above. First, we conduct unit root tests to determine whether the variables included in
the empirical analysis are stationary (see section 111.  1). Second, we test for cointegration between
prices and the monetary, labor, and external factors determining prices (see section H11.2).  Third,
we obtain single equation error  correction models for money and prices  (see  section 111.3).
Finally, we conduct parameter constancy tests to examine the stability of the money demand and
price/inflation equations (section III.4).
III.  I Testing the presence of unit roots
Standard inference procedures do not  apply to regressions that contain non-stationary
series. Therefore, for each country, we conduct augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit root tests to
evaluate whether the variables used in our empirical analysis are stationary.
Given a series
t The sample  for individual  countries  might be smaller than 1975-1998  depending  on data availability.
See the data appendix.
7yt =  + fly, - I+ a  (1)
where  t and ,B  are parameters and £t  is assumed to be white noise. Yt is stationary if -I < ,B<I. The
augmented Dickey-Fuller test to determine if y, is non-stationary is carried out by estimating an
equation with Yt-J  subtracted from both sides of the equation and adding lagged difference terms
to control for higher order correlation in the series.
Ay, = , + (fl-1)yI - i  +51Ay1  -I +  ±62Ayt -, +... +  6p -lAyI  -p  I  +  a(2)
This augmented specification is then used to test whether ,B-1=0  against the alternative that ,  -
1<0. Dickey and Fuller (1981) have determined the distribution and the critical values for this
test. Finally, non-stationary variables are differenced as many times as needed (depending on the
variables' order of integration) until stationary is achieved.
1I1.2  Testing cointegration
Following Juselius (1992), we model domestic prices in  each of the  countries in  our
sample as a function of monetary, external, and cost push factors. In other words, we assume that
consumer price inflation can be associated with inflation in the labor markets, that is wages being
above the underlying steady-state level; with monetary inflation, that is, excess money, and with
imported inflation.
For each country, we conduct Johansen (1988) cointegration tests to determine whether
there exist any long-run equilibrium relationships in the monetary, labor, and external sectors.
Given a vector autoregressive system (VAR) of order p:
y, =  Aiy. - I +... +  Apy,-  p + u,  (3)
8where yt is a k-vector of non-stationary I(1) variables and ut is a vector of innovations. The VAR
can be re-written as:
P-i






According to Granger's representation theorem, if the coefficient matrix [I has rank r<k,
then there exist kxr matrices a  and ,B  each with rank r such that H=afX' and ,B'yt  is stationary. r
determines the number of cointegrating relations (the cointegrating rank). Each column of ,B  is a
cointegrating vector. The elements of a are referred to as the adjustment parameters in the vector
error correction model.
Johansen's test of cointegration consists of estimating the HI matrix in  an unrestricted
form and testing whether we can reject the restriction implied by the reduced rank of Hl. If there
are k  endogenous variables, with one unit root each, there can be  from zero to k-I  linearly
independent, cointegrating relations. The trace and maximal-eigenvalue statistics are used to test
the number of cointegrating vectors. 12
The distribution of the cointegration tests is affected by the assumptions made about the
deterministic parts of the model. In other words, the distribution of the test depends on whether
we allow for a  trend and/or constant term  (see Johansen and Juselius  (1990), and  Johansen
12 77r  = -T_  log(1-Ai)  is  the trace statistic  and  r =  -Tlog(i-  Ar+I) refers to the maximal  eigenvalue  statistic.
In both cases, r=O,  1,2..k-2,k-  1.
9(1994)). In this paper, the constant and seasonals enter unrestrictedly in the VAR. Also, we allow
for a linear trend in the cointegration space.  1 3
As in Juselius (1992), we conduct the cointegration analysis in each sector (monetary,
labor,  and  external)  separately,  rather  than  examining  cointegration  among  all  possible
determinants of inflation for a number of reasons. In the first place, the data sample is not large
enough to  examine systems including as many as  ten variables. Secondly, as  indicated  by
Juselius (1992. p406) "a drawback of the analysis of the multivariate cointegration model is that
the difficulties of interpreting the cointegration space grow when more variables are added to the
VAR system."
1112.  a Cointegration testing in the monetary sector
We test for  cointegration  among  the variables  in the vector  Z1t={m,p,y,lo,Ja,Ap,t}  where
m is the logarithm of nominal or real M2 (depending on the order of integration of M2), y is the
logarithm of a measure of income (usually industrial production measured in logarithms), I  is
the level of the own rate of return on M2 (in most cases an average deposit rate), Pa  is the level of
a measure of the return on alternative assets outside from M2 (e.g., government bonds or bills),
and t is a time trend. In those cases where there is evidence that money is I(1), we exclude
inflation, Ap (defined as the  change in  the logarithm of prices), since this  variable will be
stationary.
13 We include  a trend in the cointegration  space  in order to obtain  a test for cointeg,ration  invariant  to the
value of the constant  term (see Johansen  (1995)).  Also, we restrict  the trend to the cointegration  space
since we typically  do not think that growth  rates are quadratic,  which they could be if the trend entered
unrestrictedly.
1011.2.  b Cointegration testing in the labor/wage sector
If wages and prices are I(1), we test for cointegration between the variables in the vector
Z  t={w,u,p,t}.  In this case, w corresponds to the logarithim  of nominal wages, u is the log of the
unemployment rate, and p is the log of prices. Once again, t is a time trend. For the countries
where prices and wages are 1(2), we obtain an I(1) representation by examining cointegration
among the following variables Z2bt={w-p ,u,Ap,t}  where w-p is the real wage (defined as the log
of wages minus the log of prices) and Ap is, once again, the inflation rate.
III 2.c Cointegration testing in the external sector
If domestic and foreign prices are I(1), we test for cointegration among the vector of
variables Z3at'={p,e,p*,I,I*,  t}. In this case, p corresponds to the logarithm of domestic prices, e
is the log of the exchange rate with respect to the dollar or deutsche mark depending on the
country, p* is the logarithm of the foreign price level (represented by the U.S. or German price
level depending on the country), I is the domestic interest rate, and I*  is the corresponding
foreign (U.S. or German) interest rate.14  Following Juselius (1992), we include interest rates in
the cointegration analysis, because the determnination  of exchange rates takes place in both the
goods and capital markets. Therefore, we need to account for the interaction between them to
understand the external effects on prices.
When there is evidence that  domestic prices could be 1(2), we examine cointegration
among the following variables Z3bt  ={p-e,p*,Ap,  1,1*  }. Once again, Ap is the inflation rate.
14 For Chile, Colombia, Japan, Kenya,  Malaysia,  and Uruguay,  the exchange  rate used is that of each
country's  domestic  currency  vis-a-vis  the dollar.  Also,  for these countries  the relevant  foreign  price level
is the U.S. price level, and the foreign  interest  rate is the rate on U.S. government  t-bills. In the case of
Denmark,  we use the krone/deutsche  mark  rate, German  prices  are the relevant  foreign  prices, and we use
the interest rate on German  government  bonds as the relevant  foreign  interest rate. The exchange  rate is
expressed  as domestic  currency  per unit of foreign  currency.
111  3 Single equation error correction modeling
After testing for cointegration in the monetary sector, we develop an error correction
model (ECM) for rnoney for each country in our sample. The conditional ECM for money is of
the form:
k-I  k-I  k-I  k-i  k-I  k-I
Am, = c + E  / 1Aml,  + E  72API-i + E  y 3 1Ay,, +  E  r4 0jt1,  + E  75Xt_; + E  Y6ZAe,  +  A,  ECMmoney,l  + w,  (5)
i=1  i=O  i=O  i=O  i=O  1=o
where C°t is a white noise error term. ECMmoney refers to the cointegrating vectors found (if any)
for the monetary sector. The remaining variables have been defined above. For those countries
where there is evidence that money and prices are 1(2), Am is replaced by A(m-p) and Ap is
replaced by AAp,  the second difference of prices..
Similarly, we develop an ECM to analyze the short-run and long-run determinants of
prices/inflation. This ECM model incorporates the cointegrating vectors found for the monetary
(ECMmoney), labor (ECMwages), and external sectors (ECMexternal;).  The ECM for prices is of
the form:
k-I  k-I  k-  k-I  k-I  k-1
Api  = C  + }r 1jAp,  j +  7r2 iAM,-,  +  Z 3 Ay,_i  + ZT 4 N 1 +i  r 5 i,l  +  E  6irwj  +
i=-  i=l  i=O  i=O  i=O  i=O
k-I  k-I  k-I  k-I  k-I
Z  r 7 1AU  +E  8 1 Aei  +  2riAp,i  +  Z  OiZQ I,  +E  P  +
i=o  ~i=O  i_=O  i=O  i=O
a*  ECMmoney  -, +  a2 * ECMwages  -, +  a3 * ECMexternal,  -, +  vt  (6)
where vt is a white noise error term and the majority of the remaining variables are defined
above. Asp refers to the change in stock prices. In those cases where money, prices, and wages
are 1(2), the first differences of these variables (Amt, Apt and Awt)  are replaced by their second
differences  (AAmt,  AApt, and AAwt respectively).
12After estimating the ECM equations for money and prices, we reduce these models to
obtain parsimonious representations. In other words, we exclude all insignificant variables and
lags. At each stage, we conduct F-tests to compare the previous model with the latest reduced
version of the model, in order to verify that the restrictions implied by the reduced model are
indeed accepted.'5
1. 4 Testing parameter constancy
We examine the stability of the single equations for money and prices in a number of
ways. First, we perforn  Hansen (1992) tests for individual coefficient, variance, and joint (error
variance and coefficients) stability. In general, these tests may have low power because the
break-point is unknown. 16 Secondly, we present sequentially estimated one-period ahead and
break-point Chow (1960) statistics. Third, to test whether the instability arises explicitly from the
crisis period, we report a Chow-type F-test, which we label F-CRISIS. This test compares the
equations estimated over the whole sample (i.e., the sample including the crisis and tranquil
periods) with the estimates for the period excluding the banking crisis. Finally, we interact the
regressors in the price equation with a dummy that equals one during crisis periods (and zero
otherwise) and we test whether these interaction terms are significant. The purpose of these
regressions  is  to  study  whether  the  relationship  between  prices  and  individual  monetary
indicators is disrupted by crises.
5  These  tests are available  upon  request.
16 See Hansen (1992).
13II.5  The data
Monthly  data  on  monetary aggregates,  financial variables  (like  exchange rates  and
interest  rates) come from  national sources (e.g.,  central bank  bulletins,  ministry  of  finance
reports, etc.) and international sources (IMF and OECD databases). Wherever possible, we also
control for the role of wages, the unemployment rate, and external factors (like foreign prices
and interest rates) in explaining prices. These variables come from the same sources mentioned
above. For all countries, we try to cover the period closest to January 1975 - June 1998. A data
appendix, at the end of the paper, describes the data used, the corresponding sources, and the
relevant sample periods for each country in our study.
IV - Empirical results
IV.1. Unit root tests
Because this study includes a significant number of countries and variables, we do not
discuss the unit root test results in detail here. However, Table A.3 in the appendix presents the
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics, for each variable, in each country, in the  sample.
Every ADF statistic is reported for the shortest lag length obtainable without dropping a lagged
difference significant at the 5% level.
For all countries, the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for any of the nominal
variables in levels. Interest rates, output, the unemployment rate, and the change in the exchange
rate appear to be unequivocally I(1) in most countries. Also, in general, prices, M2, and wages
seem to be I(1). However, for Chile, Denmark, Malaysia, and Uruguay there is some evidence
that these variables may be 1(2). In particular, for these countries, either the Dickey-Fuller tests
accept the hypothesis of a  unit root at the chosen lag length (or at surrounding lags), or the
14estimated coefficient on the lag of the variable is close to one for the chosen lag length (or for
lags surrounding it).
Given the unit root test results, we conduct the cointegration analysis assuming that all
variables (in levels or log levels) are I(1) first. For countries were the evidence is mixed, we also
try  an  1(2) approach. By  an I(2) approach, we  mean that we transform the supposedly  I(2)
variables to  obtain an  I(1)  representation before conducting the  cointegration  analysis  (see
Johansen 1995). For example, in the cointegration analysis for money, if money and prices are
1(2), an I(1) representation implies examining cointegration between m-p and Ap, along with
other I(1) variables (typically interest rates). For each country, we report the results from the
approach that yields the most sensible results, given economic theory.
1V2. Cointegration results
As discussed in the previous section, we use Johansen's (1988) procedure to conduct the
cointegration analysis for each sector, in each country. We determine the lag length of the system
used to perform the cointegration analysis by estimating a regular VAR (starting at 14 lags or 13
lags depending on whether variables are I(1) or 1(2)) and sequentially reducing the model until
the F-test for the last lag of all remaining variables reject further reduction.'7
Below, we discuss the cointegration results for all countries, by sector affecting prices.
First, we display the results for the monetary sector (section IV.2.a ). Secondly, we present the
results  obtained  for the labor  sector (section IV.2.b). Finally, we  report the  results  for  the
external sector (section IV.2.c).
7 The results from these tests are available upon request.
15IV.2.a. Cointegration results  for the monetary sector
The cointegration results for money are shown in Table 1. This table indicates the rank of
the system chosen, the names given to the cointegrating vectors found, and thle  coefficients for
the cointegrating vectors. We report the lag of the system chosen, the actual trace and maximum
eigenvalue statistics, and the corresponding  critical values in Table A.4 in the appendix.
For Chile, I)enmark, Japan, Malaysia, and Uruguay, we pursue an I(2) approach. In other
words, because we found some evidence that money and prices are 1(2) in these countries, we
transform these variables to obtain an I(1) representation suitable to test for cointegration (see
Johansen  1995). Thus, we examine the cointegration between real money (mn-p),  income (y),
inflation (Ap),  the own rate of return on money (10),  and its domestic alternative or outside return
(la).  8,  19
For all five countries mentioned above, we find at least one cointegrating vector that has
a long-run real money demand interpretation. We find that inflation always has a negative impact
on real money demand as expected, and income has a unit elasticity. The ownl  rate of return on
money (i.e., the average deposit rate) is positive and significant in the equations for Denmark,
Japan, and Uruguay. Furthermore, the own and outside rates of return on money have opposite
and equal effects for Japan and Denmark.20,21  For Chile and Malaysia, interest rates do not affect
money demand.
18 Initially,  given  the unit root results,  we assumed  all variables  to be I(l) and we tested for cointegration
between  m,p,y, I', and la.  However,  for these countries  this approach  was unsuccessful  (the results are
available upon request).  Also, given that from the unit root tests there was some evidence  that prices,
money,  and wages are  1(2),  we decided  to test for cointegration  using  an 1(2)  approach.
19 The exact  definition  of the return  for money  and the outside  rate of return  for each country  is in the data
appendix.
20 Following  Juselius  (1998),  we allow a dummy  that captures  the period  after the withdrawal  of capital
controls in Denmark  to enter the cointegration  space. This dummy is significant  in the cointegration
vector  for money  demand,  indicating  that money  demand  fell following  the banning  of controls.
21 For Chile, Colombia,  and Uruguay,  we do not include the rate of return outside of money from the
16Aside from a long-run relationship for real money, for Chile, Denmark, and Malaysia, we
also find evidence of the existence of other cointegrating vectors. For Chile, the second vector
indicates that income is stationary around a trend, while the third vector suggests that the deposit
rate is stationary. For Denmark, the Johansen procedure points to a rank 2 system. The second
cointegrating vector for Denmark reflects a positive relationship between inflation, output, and
interest rates spreads. For Malaysia, aside from the money vector, we also find that income, the
own rate of return on money, and the outside rate are each stationary around a trend.
For Colombia and Kenya, where the Dickey-Fuller tests indicated that prices and money
are I(1), we test for cointegration between nominal M2 (m), prices (p), the own rate of return on
money  (I°),  and  its  alternative return  (Ia). We  find  that  for  these  countries  at  least  one
cointegrating vector can be interpreted as a long-run money demand equation. We can  also
accept price homogeneity and unit income elasticities for these countries. For Colombia, interest
rates do not  seem to enter the long-run equation, while in Kenya we find that the outside or
alternative rate of return on money has a negative impact on money demand.
For Colombia, we also find a second vector that specifies that the own return on money is
trend stationary. For Kenya, we find two extra vectors, aside from the money demand vector.
The second vector indicates a relationship between output, the outside interest rate, and a trend.
The final vector shows that the spread between the own and outside rates of return on money is
stationary around a trend.
Summarizing, the fact that we find evidence of cointegration in the monetary sector of all
countries, even though these countries underwent banking crises at some point in the sample,
indicates that the long-run stability of money demand is not threatened by these episodes.
cointegration  equations since there was no consistent  measure for these countries for the full sample
period.
17IV. 2.  b. Cointegration resultsfor the labor/wage  sector
Table 2 reports the cointegration results for the labor/wage sector for all countries. In the
case of Chile, Denmark, Japan, and Uruguay, given that we found some evidence that prices and
wages are 1(2), we test for cointegration between real wages (w-p), inflaLtion  (Ap), and the
unemployment rate (u).
For each of the four countries mentioned above, we find evidence of one cointegrating
vector with a long-run real wage interpretation. For Chile, Denmark, and Uruguay, we find that
inflation and the unemployment rate negatively affect real wages. In the case of Japan, aside
from testing cointegration between w-p, Ap, and u, we also include a dummy for July and June
1997 interacted by a trend. These variables aim to  control for bonus payments paid in June
during the early part of the sample and later in July of each year. We find one cointegrating
vector where real wages are negatively affected by inflation. The unemployment rate does not
seem to enter this relation.
For  Colombia,  we  test  for  cointegration  between  nominal  wages,  prices,  and  the
unemployment rate, given that we concluded from the unit root tests that prices and wages in
Colombia are I(1). We find that wages are positively affected by prices, but the unemployment
rate does not appear to play a significant role.
Finally, we do not report results for Kenya and Malaysia, because high frequency wage
data is not available for these countries, for the period under consideration.
IV 2.  c. Cointegration results  for the external sector
Table 3 presents the cointegration results for the external sector. For Chile, Denmark,
Japan, Malaysia, and Uruguay, where we found evidence that prices could be I(2), we use the
18Johansen  technique  to  test  for  cointegration  between  domestic  prices  expressed  in  foreign
currency  (p-e), foreign  prices  (p*),  inflation  (Ap), the domestic  interest  rate  (I), and  the  foreign
interest  rate  (I*).22 For Colombia  and Kenya,  we  pursue  an I(l)  approach  instead.  Thus,  we  test
for  cointegration  between  domestic  prices  (p), the  dollar  exchange  rate  (e),  foreign  prices  (p*),
the domestic  interest  rate  (I), and the  foreign  interest  rate (1*). Foreign  prices  (p*)  refer  to U.S.
dollar  prices  in the  case  of Chile,  Colombia,  Japan,  Kenya,  Malaysia,  and  Uruguay.  Also,  for
these  countries,  the  exchange  rate  is the  domestic  currency  rate  vis-a-vis  the  dollar  and  foreign
interest  rates refer  to the return  on  dollar  assets  (typically  T-bills).  For Denmark,  foreign  prices
are German  prices,  the  foreign  interest  rate is the rate on deutsche  mark  denominated  assets,  and
the exchange  rate is the krone/deutsche  mark  exchange  rate.
For  Chile,  Denmark,  Japan,  Malaysia,  and  Uruguay,  where  the  empirical  evidence
indicates  that  prices  are  I(2),  we  find  at  least  one  cointegrating  vector  that  has  a  purchasing
power  parity  (PPP)  interpretation  including  a  dynamic  term,  Ap. 23 Furthermore,  in the  case  of
Denmark,  Japan,  and Uruguay,  there  is evidence  of a second  vector  that can be interpreted  as an
uncovered  interest  rate parity  (UIP) relationship,  given that Ap=Ae. 24
22 For Chile, Denmark, Japan, Malaysia, and Uruguay we test for cointegration between p-e, Ap, p*,i, and
i*, given that for these countries we found evidence that p  is 1(2). In general, we find a cointegrating
vector between p-e, p* and Ap. This is evidence that p is 1(2). Also, this suggests that e or p* are 1(2). In
general, we do not think p* (German or U.S. prices) is 1(2).  We tested for cointegration assuming p* to be
1(2), but the attempt was mostly unsuccessful. The only other possibility is that  e  is 1(2). The main
problem with this interpretation is that the Dickey-Fuller tests do not point to e being 1(2). A possible
explanation for this seemingly contradictory evidence is that Ae is I(t),  but it has a large l(O) component
on top of it. Thus, when we look at it as a univariate process all we see is white noise. However, when it
comes to system analysis, it could be that p and e have matching 1(2) components that cancel out and that
may explain why we find cointegration between these variables.
23  In the case of Chile, we test for cointegration between p-e, e, Ap, and p*. We do not include interest
rates, because  the  money  demand  cointegration analysis  suggested that  the  Chilean  interest rate  is
stationary.
24 If p and e are 1(2) and p-e is I(l), then Ap and Ae are each I(l),  but Ap=Ae+I(O).
19As mentioned above, for Colombia and Kenya, we exarnine cointegration between p, e,
p*, I, and I*, since p and e appear to be I(1) in these countries. For Colombia, we find evidence
of three cointegrating vectors. The first vector has a PPP interpretation. The last two vectors
indicate that I and I* are stationary. For Kenya, we find two cointegrating vectors. The first
vector is a combination of a PPP relationship and the I-I* spread. The second vector indicates
that the spread betwveen  I and I* is trend stationary.
IV 3. Reduced single equation money demand results:
Is the stability of money demand affected by banking crises?
In this  section, we present and discuss the results  for the parsimonious, conditional,
single-equation model for  broad money demand for  each country in  our  sample. The main
purpose of this section is to test the constancy of broad money demand. In other words, we want
to test whether countries that have experienced banking crises are likely to exhibit non-constant
broad money demand functions.
Tables 4 to 1O  report the estimated coefficients, standard errors, and test statistics for the
reduced and  final  money demand  equations for  Chile, Colombia,  Denmark, Japan,  Kenya,
Malaysia, and Uruguay, respectively. For all countries with the exception of Japan, we include
the change in the exchange rate  (Ae) as a regressor in the single equation for money.25 We
introduce this variable to control for the possibility of flight to foreign currency in countries were
there are not a lot of competing assets relative to bank deposits, and/ or where the exchange rate
has been traditionally pegged to a foreign currency. 26
25 With the exception  of Denmark,  where we use the krone/deutsche  mark exchange  rate, for all other
countries  the exchange  rate variable  refers  to the domestic  currency  rate with respect  to the dollar.
26 We did not include  the change  in the exchange  rate in the cointegration  analysis,  because  we found  this
variable  to be I(O)  for all countries  according  to the Dickey  Fuller  tests.
20For Colombia and Kenya, where money and prices appear to be  I(1), inflation is not
significant. We find that in all remaining countries, inflation, Ap (or the change in inflation (AAp
or A2p ) depending on the country), is significant and has a negative effect on the demand for real
money.
With the exception of Japan, changes in income (y) have a positive effect on the demand
for money. However, income is significant only in the equations for Chile and Malaysia.
The own rate of return on M2, I° (typically the average deposit rate), has a positive and
significant impact on the demand for broad money in Chile, Kenya, and Uruguay. This variable
is positive but insignificant for Colombia and Japan, and negative but insignificant in Denmark,
and Malaysia. Changes in the outside or alternative rate of return on money, la, have a significant
negative  impact  on  money  demand  in  Denmark  and  Kenya.  However,  this  variable  is
insignificant in the equations for Japan and Malaysia.
Exchange rate changes are mostly significant and have a negative impact on the demand
for broad money in Colombia, Denmark, and Kenya. 27 In the case of Uruguay, the exchange rate
has both a positive and negative impact on broad money, depending on the lag length. However,
the overall effect is zero. The exchange rate is not significant in Chile and Malaysia. Finally, the
error correction terms associated with long-run money demand are significant and negative in the
dynamic money demand equations for all countries.
Tables 4 to  10, also  present various  diagnostic  statistics, which  show that  the  final
equations obtained  are well  specified. These  diagnostics statistics  are tests  against various
alternative hypotheses: residual autocorrelation (AR), skewness and excess kurtosis (normality),
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH), and heteroscedasticity (hetero). The null
27 An increase  in the exchange  rate represents  a depreciation.
21distribution of these statistics is designated by X2(.) or F(.,.), and the degrees of freedom are in
parentheses.
With the exception of the AR test for Japan, we can accept the null hypotheses for each
of these tests, in each of these countries. In other words, all equations for all countries are well
specified except for the fact that there is some evidence of residual autocorrelation for Japan.
-As  mentioned  above, parameter  constancy  is  a  critical  issue  we  want  to  analyze
concerning the estimated money demand functions. Figures 4 to  10 show innovations, one step
residuals, sequentially estimated one-period ahead Chow (1960) and break-point Chow (1960)
statistics. In these figures, the sequentially estimated Chow statistics are labeled l upChows and
NdnChows, respectively.28  Also, Tables 4 to 10 report the Hansen (1992) coefficients, variance,
and joint test for parameter constancy. Finally, we test whether the model estimated over the
whole sample is equivalent to that estimated over the period excluding the banking crisis. This
test statistic is distributed as F(nl,n2), where nl  is the number of observations in the crisis period
(i.e., the omitted observations), and n2 is the degrees of freedom of the model estimated over the
full sample. If this F-test -labeled F-CRISIS- rejects, then we can infer that the instability in the
money demand function arises from the period of the banking crisis, since the only difference
between the overall sample and the sample excluding the crisis is the crisis period itself.
According to the recursively estimated Chow tests, Hansen stability tests, and F-CRISIS
money demand in Chile, Denmark, Japan, and Malaysia appears to be stable' 29 So, from these
28 The recursively  estimated Chow tests are only useful in those cases when they include the crisis
periods. In some countries,  however,  because our data sample starts well into the crisis, the recursive
estimates  start after the crisis period or well into it. In these cases,  we rely on the F-CRISIS  and Hansen
tests for stability.
29 In the case  of Chile and Japan,  we observe  some one-period  ahead  Chow  statistics  that reject at 5%, but
they  are too few to jeopardize  the overall  stability  of the estimated  equation.
22results, it seems that banking crises in these countries have not threatened the stability of the
money demand equations.
The Hansen tests as well as the one-period ahead and break-point Chow tests provide
evidence  of  parameter  instability in  the  estimated money  demand  equation  for  Colombia.
However, the instability in the equation seems to be coming from the period after the banking
crisis. The Colombian banking crisis took place between 1982-87. When we estimate the model
through  1989, rather than the overall  sample 1981-1998, we find  no evidence of instability
according to the Hansen, and Chow tests (see figure 5.B.).
The one-period ahead Chow and, in particular, the break-point Chow tests provide some
evidence of money demand instability in Kenya. However, the evidence is very marginal at 5%
significance. Furthermore, the Hansen stability tests and the F-CRISIS indicate that the equation
is stable. So, overall, we believe the results for Kenya accept the hypothesis of money demand
stability.
Regarding the stability tests for the Uruguayan money equation, the results are mixed. On
the one hand, the Hansen tests accept stability, but the F-CRISIS test rejects. Given that the
Hansen tests typically have low power because the break-point is unknown, we are inclined to
rely more heavily on the F-CRISIS test results. The one-period ahead Chow and break-point
Chow tests are not particularly useful in this case because the recursive estimations conducted to
obtain these tests start after the crisis period. However, it is clear from these figures, in particular
from the residual bands, that the estimation in the 1980s was less precise and stable than during
the 1990s. This suggests that the banking crisis during the period 1981-85 may have affected
money demand stability in Uruguay.
23To summarize, the results in this section show that with the exception of Uruguay, we
find no overwhelming evidence that banking crises jeopardize broad money demand stability. 30
Table 11 presents a summary of the stability test results for the money demand functions in all
countries. The  evidence presented here, together  with  the  cointegration results  for  money,
indicate that whatever changes may have occurred in  the  demand for money owing  to  the
banking crises can be explained by the same function used to model money demand at times of
tranquility. Thus, we find that banking crises do not systematically threaten the short-run or long-
run broad money demand functions.
IV 4. Reduced single equations  for prices: Do banking crises cause structural breaks in
the relationship between prices and monetary indicators ?
Tables 13 through  19 report the coefficients, standard errors, and test statistics for the
parsimonious price single equations estimated over the full sample for each country. By full
sample, we refer to the period covering the crisis and the tranquil episodes. 3 ' We find that lagged
changes in broad money (or the second difference depending on the country) have a positive and
significant impact on inflation (or its growth rate depending on the country) in Chile, Denmark,
Japan, Kenya, and Uruguay. Money is insignificant for Colombia and Malaysia.
For Denmark, Japan, and Uruguay, changes in income are positive and  significant in
explaining prices. For all other countries, income is insignificant. Changes in the exchange rate
(dollar exchange rate with the exception of Denmark) are largely significant and have a positive
effect on inflation. Exchange rate changes are not significant for the Colombian and Danish price
equations.
30 In the case of Colombia, we found evidence of instability but it seemed to be arising in the 1990s, many
years  after the financial  crisis in this country.
24Foreign price changes (U.S. for all countries except Denmark where we include German
prices) are, in general, positive  and significant. On the other hand,  foreign interest rates are
significant only in the cases of Colombia and Uruguay.
Domestic interest rates (typically, the rate of return on money and its outside rate) have a
negative significant impact on inflation. This is particularly the case for Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
and Uruguay. For Kenya and Denmark, the own rate of return on money has  a positive and
significant effect.
Wage changes are significant for Colombia and Uruguay at 5%  significance and  for
Denmark and Japan at 10%. In general, increases in wages result in higher inflation. On the other
hand,  increases  in  unemployment have  a  negative  impact  on  inflation, but  they  are  only
significant for the case of Chile and Uruguay. Finally, stock prices changes (denoted as sp) have.
no significant impact on consumer price inflation across country. 32
The significance of the error correction terms varies largely across countries. The PPP
error correction terms are significant in the case of Chile and Denmark, while the error correction
term interpretable as a UIP relationship is significant in the price equations for Denmark, Japan,
and Uruguay. The money error correction terms affect prices in the equations for Denmark and
Japan. Finally, wage cointegrating vectors are significant only for Denmark and Japan.
At  the  bottom  of  Tables  13 to  19,  we  present  the  diagnostic  tests  for  residual
autocorrelation (AR),  skewness  and  excess  kurtosis  (normality), autoregressive  conditional
heteroskedasticity (ARCH), and heteroscedasticity (hetero). None of the price equations reject
any of these specification tests. Thus, none of the estimated price equations present specification
problems.
31 For most countries, the full sample covers approximately the period 1975-1998.
32 Stock prices were only available for Chile, Colombia, and Japan.
25We analyze the  constancy of  the  estimated price  equations using  mostly the  same
methodology discussed for the money demand equations (see section IV.3). Figures 13 to  19
show innovations, one step residuals, sequentially estimated one-period ahead Chow and break-
point  Chow statistics.  In  these figures,  the  Chow  statistics are  labeled as  lupChows  and
NdnChows, respectively. Also, we report the Hansen coefficients, variance, and joint  tests for
parameter constancy. In the Hansen tests, the break point date is  unknown,, so a finding of
instability cannot be immediately connected to a given period. Therefore, to examine whether the
instability is arising directly from the banking crisis period, we conduct a Chow-type F-test
(labeled F-CRISIS as before) that compares the estimation of the model for the overall sample,
with  the  results  obtained  for  the  sample  excluding  the  crisis  period.  We  summarize  the
information on these stability tests for the price equations in Table 12.
Both the Hansen tests, and the break point Chow test indicate that  the Chilean price
equation is stable. Also, F-CRISIS fails to find any evidence that the banking crisis period led to
instability in the price equation. We obtain similar results for the Danish and Malaysian price
equations.
According to the sequentially estimated one-period ahead and break-point Chow tests, the
Colombian  price  equation  appears  stable.  However,  the  Hansen  tests  reject  stability.  In
particular, these statistics point to variance instability. This seemingly contradictory results can
be reconciled by the fact that the recursive estimations start well into the sample. In other words,
the Chow tests are not very useful in this case, because they practically do not cover the crisis
period. 33 The F-CRISIS test rejects the hypothesis that both periods can be explained by the same
33 The Colombian  crisis took place between 1982-88.  Recursive  estimations  for the price equation start
around 1987.
26equation. This seems to point to the fact that the price equation is particularly unstable during the
banking crisis in Colombia.
Regarding the stability of the Japanese price equation, the Hansen tests  indicate  the
presence of instability. However, this  applies only to variance instability and the evidence is
marginal, since the critical value for the Hansen variance test at 5% significance is roughly 0.5
and the test statistic is 0.52 (Hansen (1992)). Furthermore, the break-point Chow and F-CRISIS
tests, indicate parameter constancy over the crisis period.
In the case of Kenya, the Hansen tests for variance stability, the one-period ahead, and
the break point Chow tests  indicate that the equation is not  constant. In particular, we  can
observe from the recursively estimated Chow tests that the instability seems to occur during the
1990s. Kenya experienced two banking crises one over the period 1985-89 and another over the
period 1992-95. The F-test for the 1980s crisis suggests that this period is not different from the
overall sample. However, the 1990s crisis does appear to be different than the non-crisis period.
The evidence on stability for the Uruguayan price equation is mixed. The Hansen test
accepts stability, but F-CRISIS, rejects. Thus, we are inclined to rely on the F-CRISIS result. The
one-period ahead Chow and break-point Chow tests  are not  useful  in this  case because  the
recursive estimations conducted to  obtain these tests start after the crisis period. However, we
can see from the residual bands that the estimation in the 1980s was less precise and stable than
during the 1990s.
The parameter constancy results discussed above focus mostly on the overall stability of
the price equations. In order to test whether individual coefficients in the price equation are
affected by the banking crises, we include interaction terms of each variable with a dummy that
takes a value of one during the crisis periods. These results are reported in tables 20 through 26.
27With respect to the interaction terms for money, they are negative in the case of Chile,
Colombia, and Japan. This indicates that the coefficient on money is smaller during the banking
crises in these countries. However, Japan is the only country where these interaction terms are
significant. The i.nteraction  terms for money are positive for Denmark, Kenya, Malaysia, and
Uruguay, but they are only significant at the 5% level in the case of the latter.
Regarding other indicators such as  exchange rates, domestic interest rates, and  stock
prices, we find only marginal changes in the coefficients for exchange rates during crisis periods
for Malaysia. Neither interest rates nor stock prices exhibit a significant increase or decrease in
their coefficients during the banking crisis periods. Furthermore, we find that with the exception
of Kenya, all interaction terms are jointly insignificant.
To summarize, the results from this section indicate that money, exchange rates, foreign
prices, and domestic interest rates are significant in explaining prices in most countries. Stock
prices, on the other hand, are not useful indicators of price behavior. In general, the relationship
between prices and individual monetary indicators is stable, despite the occurrence of crises.
However, in three out of seven countries we find some evidence of variance instability in the
price equations.
V -Conclusions
Until very recently, not much attention was devoted to the monetary impact of banking
crises. Two exceptions, Garcia-Herrero (1997) and Lindgren et al. (1996), warned about some of
the  adverse effects of  banking  crises for  the conduct  of  monetary policy.  Using  mostly a
descriptive approach, the authors argue that banking crises have significant implications for
money demand stability, for the effectiveness of instruments, for the relationship between prices
28and monetary indicators, and for the overall impact of monetary policy. Though both of these
studies are very interesting and informative, they arrive at their conclusions without a systematic
empirical investigation of the issues they raise.
This study has attempted to fill this void in the literature on the monetary  impact of
banking crises. Using cointegration analysis and error correction modeling, we examined the
claim that  banking crises jeopardize  money demand stability. Secondly, we used  the  same
empirical methodology to examine the overall stability of the process for inflation, as well as the
impact of crises on the coefficients of individual monetary indicators.
Our results  suggest that the stability of money demand is not threatened by banking
crises. With the  exception of  Uruguay, we found that money demand  functions are  stable.
Regarding the indicators of price behavior, we found that changes in money, exchange rates,
foreign prices, and domestic interest rates seem to be useful in explaining prices. Finally, even
though in general we did not find that individual coefficients in the price equations change as a
result of banking crises, in three out of the seven countries, we uncovered evidence of variance
instability in these equations due to crises.
Given the results in this paper, we can draw two main conclusions that might be helpful
for policy-makers facing  banking crises. First,  policymakers in  countries undergoing  crises
should not  be worried about the structural stability of money demand functions. Our results
indicate that the behavior of money demand during crises can be modeled by the same function
as during periods of tranquility. Second, although individual coefficients in the price equations
do not seem to be severely affected by crises, policy-makers should be aware that crises, in some
instances, can give rise to variance instability in the price/inflation equations.
29References
Abdullah, Ahmad Zainudin and Zulkomain Yusop (1996), "Money Inflation and Causality: The
Case of Malaysia (1970-992),"  Asian Economic Review, vol. 38, no. 1, 44-51.
Adam, Christopher (1992), "Recent Developments in Econometric Methods: an Application to
the Demand for Money in Kenya," African Economic Research Consortium, Special
Paper, No. 15.
(1992), "On the Dynamic  Specification  of Money  Demand  in Kenya,"
Journal of African Economies, vol. 1, no. 2, 233-270.
Apt, Jaime and Jorge A. Quiroz (1992), "Una Demanda por Dinero Mensual para Chile: 1983:1
1992:8," Revista de Analisis Economico, vol. 7, no. 2, 103-139.
Arize, Augustine C. (1990), "Effects of Financial Innovations on the Money Demand Function:
Evidence from Japan," International Economic Journal, vol. 4, no. 1, 59-70.
, S. L. Avard, V. Ukpolo (1997), "Multivariate Cointegration Tests of the
Impact of International Factors on Money Demand," The International Journal of
Finance, vol  9, no. 1, 482-504.
Baba, Yoshihisa, David F. Hendry, Ross M. Starr (1992), "The Demand for MI  in the USA,
1960-1988," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 59, no. 198, 25-61.
Baumgartner, J. and R. Ramaswamy (1996), "Inflation Targeting in the United K<ingdom:
Information Content of Financial and Monetary Variables," IMF Working Paper,
WP/96/44.
and R. Ramaswamy,  and Goran Zettergren  (1997), "Monetary  Policy  and
Leading Indicators of Inflation in Sweden," IMF Working Paper, WP/97/34.
Bayoumi, Tamim (1998), "Japan: Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/113.
30Brownbridge, Martin (1998), "Financial Distress in Local Banks in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and
Zambia: Causes and Implications for Regulatory Policy," Development Policy Review,
173-88.
Brunello, Giorgio (1995), "Recent Changes in the Internal Structure of Wages and
Unemployment in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, vol. 9,
105-129.
Caprio, Gerard and Daniela Klingebiel (1996), "Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy, or Bad
Banking?" World Bank -Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics.
Caramazza, Francesco and Slawner, Chad (1991), "The Relationship Between Money, Output
and Prices," Bank of Canada, Working Paper 91-4.
Chakrabarti, Santi K. and J. A. Ali (1992), "Prices in Kenya: An Empirical Investigation,"
Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion Paper, 1-22.
Chow, Gregory (1960), "Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear
Regressions," Econometrica, 28, 3, 591-605.
Chye, Tan Eu, and M. Semudram (1988), "The monetary Versus Neo-Keynesian Controversy
over Inflation: The Malaysian Evidence," The Indian Economic Journal, vol. 36, No. 1,
July-September, 48-54.
Corker, Robert (1990), "Wealth, Financial Liberalization, and the Demand for Money in Japan,"
IMF Staff Papers, vol. 37, no. 2, June 1990, 418-432.
Cuthbertson, K, and M. P. Taylor (1988), "Alternative Scale Variables in the U.S. Demand
Function for Narrow Money: Some Non-nested Tests," The Cyprus Journal of
Economics, vol. 1, no. 2, 102-110.
Darby, M., Angel Mascaro and Michael Marlow (1989), "The Empirical Reliability of Monetary
31Aggregates as Indicators: 1983-1987,"  Economic Inquiry, vol. XXVII.
Darrat, Ali F. (1985), "The Demand for Money in a Developing Economy: The Case of Kenya,"
World Development, 13, October/November, 1163-70.
Davis, E.P. and S.G.B. Henry (1994), "The Use of Financial Spreads as Indica,tor  Variables:
Evidence for the UK and Germany," IMF Working Paper, WP/94/3  1.
Dhakal, Dharmendra, Magda Kandil, Subhash C. Sharma, and Paul B. Trescott (1993), "The
Inflationary Experiences of  Six  Developing  Countries in  Asia:  an  Investigation  of
Underlying Determinants," Applied Economics, vol. 25, no. 3, 413-42  5.
De Brouwer, Gordon and Neil Ericsson (1998), "Modelling Inflation in Australia," Journal of
Business and Economics Statistics, Vol, No.4, 43  3-449.
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Enrica Detragiache (1997), "The Determinants of Banking Crises:
Evidence from Industrial and Developing Countries," The World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 1828, September.
Dickey, D. and W.A. Fuller (1981), "Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time Series
with a Unit Root," Econometrica, 49, 1057-1072.
Dominioni, Daniel and Jose-Antonio Licandro (1989), "La Banca Privada Uruguaya en la Crisis
de los Anos Ochenta," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol.
12, no. 2, 197-223.
Doornik, Jurgen and David F. Hendry (1997), Modeling Dynamic Systems Using PcFiml 9.  0,
International Thomsom Business Press, London.
Ericsson, Neil R. (1992), "Cointegration, Exogeneity, and Policy Analysis: An Overview,"
Journal of Policy Modeling 14(3), 251-280.
, David F. Hendry, and Kevin M. Prestwich (1998), "Tlhe  Demand for
32Broad Money in the United Kingdom, 1878-1993,"  Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
100(1), 289-324.
_  and Sunil Sharna  (1998), "Broad  Money Demand  and Financial
Liberalization in Greece," Empirical Economics, 23, 417-436.
Fielding, David (1994) "Money Demand in Four African Countries," Journal of Economic
Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, 3-37.
Friedman, B. and Kenneth N. Kuttner (1992), "Money, Income, Prices and Interest Rates,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No.3, 472-492.
Friedman, M. And Anna Jacobson Schwartz,  A Monetary History of the United States, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1963.
Frowen, Stephen F. and  Herbert Buscher (1990), "The Demand for Money in the U.S., UK,
Japan and West Germany: an Empirical Study of the Evidence since 1973," University
College London Dept. of Economics. Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 90-05.
Fullerton, Thomas M. Jr. (1993), "Inflationary Trends in Colombia," Journal of Policy
Modeling, vol. 15, no. 4, 463-468.
Garcia-Herrero, Alicia (1997), "Monetary Impact of a Banking Crisis and the Conduct of
Monetary Policy," IMF Working Paper,WP/97/124.
,"Banking  Crises in Latin America in the 1990s: Lessons from
Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela," IMF Working Paper, WP/97/140.
Geraghty, Coleen (1987), "Countrywatch: Malaysia, Banks Worry About Bad Debts and
Funding Costs," Asian Finance, 40-51.
Goldsbrough, D. and I. Zaidi (1989), "Monetary Policy in the Philippines during Periods of
Financial Crisis and Changes in Exchange Rate Regime: Targets, Instruments, and the
33Stability of Money Demand," IMF Working Paper, WP/89/98.
Gosh, B. and S.C. Gan (1994), "On the Choice of Appropriate  Money Stock for Malaysia," The
Indian Journal of Economics, nr. 297, 269-279.
Graziani, Carlo (1988), "La Dinamica de la Inflacion: el Caso de Uruguay," Monetaria, Centro
de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos,  Vol. 11, no. 1, 41-66.
Greene, William (1993), Econometric Analysis, Second Edition, Macmillan Publishing
Company, New York.
Habibulla, Muzafar Shab (1990), "Choice of Scale Variable and the Specification of the
Malaysian Money Demand function: A Note," The Indian Economic Journal, vol. 38, no.
1, 79-88.
_  (1991), "Money and Its Substitutes in a Developing Economy:
Empirical Evidence  from Malaysia, " The Indian Economic Journal, vol. 39, no. 1, 60-
72.
Hamann, Javier (1993), "Financial Liberalization and the Information Content of Money in
Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines," IMF Working Paper, WP/93/88.
Hausmann, Ricardo and Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Banking Crises in Latin America, Inter-American
Development Bank, Washington D.C.
Hamilton, James (1994), Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey.
Hansen, Bruce (1992), "Testing for Parameter Instability in Linear Models," Journal of Policy
Modeling, 1.4(4),  517-533.
Hendry, David F. and Jurgen A. Doornik (1999), Empirical Econometric Modeling Using
PcGive 9.  0, Timberlake Consultants Ltd., UK.
34Herrera, Santiago and A., Juan Manuel Julio (1993), "La Demanda de Dinero en la Corto y en la
Largo Plazo en Colombia," Conyuntura Economica, vol. 23, no. 1, 91-107.
Herrera, Luis Oscar and Rodrigo Vergara (1992), "Estabilidad de la Demanda de Dinero,
Cointegration y Politica Monetaria," Cuadernos de Economia, vol. 29, no. 86, 35-54.
Horrigan, Brian (1986), "Monetary Indicators, Commodity Prices, and Inflation," Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No., 86-7.
Hostland, D., Poloz S., and P. Storer (1987), "An Analysis of the Information Content of
Alternative Monetary Aggregates," Bank of Canada Technical Reports. No. 48.
Hutchison, Michael (1998) "Empirical Determinants of Banking Crises: Japan's Experience in
International Perspective," University of California, Santa Cruz, Working Papers 422, 1-
36.
Johansen, S. (1988), "Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors," Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 12, 231-254.
and Katarina  Juselius  (1990), "Maximum  Likelihood  Estimation  and
Inference on Cointegration - with Applications to the Demand for Money," Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 52, 2, 169-211.
(1991), "Estimation  and Hypothesis  Testing  of Cointegration  Vectors  in
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models," Econometrica, 59, 6, 1551-1580.
(1994), "The  Role of the Constant  and Linear  Terms in Cointegration
Analysis of Nonstationary Variables," Econometric Reviews, 13(2), 205-229.
(1995), Likelihood-based Inference  in Cointegrated  vector Autoregressive
Models, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Juselius, Katarina (1988), "Cointegration and Identification in a Vector Time Series Model an
35Application to the Demand for Money in Denmark," Discussion Papers from Institute of
Economics, University of Copenhagen, 88-03.
_  (1989),  "Long-run  Relations  in a Well-defined  Statistical  Model for the Data
Generating Process. Cointegration Analysis of the PPP and the UIP Relations for
Denmark and Germany," Discussion Papers from Institute of Economics, University of
Copenhagen, 90-11.
.(1992),  "Domestic  and Foreign  Effects on Prices  in an Open Economy:  The
Case of Denmark," Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 14, no. 4, 1992, 401-428.
.(1993),  "VAR  Modeling  and Haavelmo's  Probability  Approach  to
Macroeconomic Modeling," Empirical Economics, 18, 1993, 595-622.
(1998), "Changing  Monetary  Transmission  mechanisms  within the EU,"
Empirical Economics, 23, 455-481.
Kamas, Linda  (1995), "Monetary  Policy and Inflation  under the Crawling  Peg: Some Evidence
from VARs for Colombia," Journal of Development Economics, vol. 46, 145-161.
Karatzas G. (1993), "Government Deficits, Monetization, International Reserve-  Flows, and
Inflation in Selected African Countries," Economia Internazionale, 46, May-Aug, 201
-224.
Koskenyla, Heikki (1994), "The Nordic Banking Crises," Bulletin, Bank of Firlland, 15-22.
Lindgren, C., Gillian Garcia and Matthew I. Saal (1996), Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic
Policy, IMF publication services, Washington, D.C.
Machua, Wilfred (1986), "Kenya's Bank Failures: Bankers Speak Out," African Business,
22-24.
Magendzo W., Igal, "La Politica Monetaria en Chile en la Decada de los Noventa: Objectivos,
36Herramientas e Indicadores," Serie de Estudios Economicos, No. 41.
Martner, Ricardo F. and Daniel Titelman K. (1993), "Un Analisis de Cointegracion de las
Funciones de Demanda de Dinero: el Caso de Chile," EL Trimestre Economico, Mexico,
vol. LX(2), 413-446.
Mathieson, D. and Haas, R. (1994), "Establishing Monetary Control in Financial Systems with
Insolvent Institutions," IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment, PPAA/94/10.
Matte, Ricardo E. and Patricio Rojas R. (1989), "Evolucion Reciente del Mercado
Monetario y una Estimacion de la Demanda por Dinero en Chile," Cuadernos de
Economia, vol. 26, no. 78, 195-216.
Mbitiru, Chege (1986), "Bank Collapse Forces Government Action," Africa Now, 31-32.
McNown, Robert and Myles S. Wallace (1989), "National Price Levels, Purchasing Power
Parity, and Cointegration: A Test of Four High Inflation Economies," Journal of
International Money and Finance, vol. 8, no. 4, 533-545.
Miller, Stephen M. (1991), "Monetary Dynamics: An Application of Cointegration and Error
Correction Modeling," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 23, no. 1, 139-154.
Muhleisen, Martin (1995), "Monetary Policy and Inflation Indicators for Finland," IMF Working
Paper, WP/95/115.
Mwega, F. M. and Tony Killick (1990), "Monetary Policy in Kenya, 1967-88," Eastern Africa
Economic  Review,  vol.  6, no. 2, 117-142.
Njuguna Ndung'u (1993), "Dynamics of the Inflationary Process in Kenya," Ekonomiska studier
utgivna av Nationalekonomiska institutionen handelshogskolan vid Goteborgs universitet
,47.
Perez-Campanero, Juan and Alfredo M. Leone (1991), "Liberalization and Financial Crisis in
37Uruguay (1974-1987)," IMF Working Paper,WP/91/30.
Reinhart, Carmen and Vincent R. Reinhart (1991), "Output Fluctuations and Monetary Shocks:
Evidence from Colombia," IMF Working Paper, WP/91/35.
Sheng, Andrew (1996), Bank Restructuring, Lessons  from the 1980s, The World Bank, 1996
Sims, Christopher A (1972), "Money, Income, and Causality," American Economic Review,
62, 540-52.
________  , "Comparison  of Interwar  and Postwar  Business  Cycles:  Monetarism
Reconsidered," American Economic Review, (Papers and Proceedings), 70, 250-7.
Soejima, Yutaka (1996), "The Long-Run Relationship between Real GDP, Money Supply, and
Price Level: Reexamination of Cointegration Test," IMES Discussion Paper 96-E-9.
Stock, James and Watson, Mark W. (1989), "Interpreting the Evidence on Money-Income
Causality," Journal of Econometrics, 40, 161-82.
Sundararajan, V. and T. Balifio, Banking Crises: Cases and Issues, IMF Publication Services,
Washington, D.C., 1991.
Tamura, Tatsuya (1992), "Monetary Control in Japan, " in Monetary Policy ain  Financial
Innovations in Five Industrial Countries,  Edited by Stephen F. Frowen, St. Martin  's
Press, New York, 101-119.
Wonsewer, Israel (1986), "La Inflacion en la Uruguay," Pensamiento Iberoamericano, Enero/
Junio, 167-172.
Wunder, Dieter (1990), "Inflacion en Colombia: Estimacion de un Modelo de Ecuaciones
Simultaneas," Estudios de Economia, vol 17. No. 1, Jun. 90, 283-342.
Yoshida, Tomoo (1990), "On the Stability of Japanese Money Demand Function: Estimation
Results Using the Error Correction Model,"  Bank of Japan Monetary aznd  Economic
38Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, 1-48.
Yoshikawa, Hiroshi and Yoshiyuki Takeuchi (1989), "Real Wages and the Japanese Economy,"
Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 1-39.
Yusoff, Mohammed bin (1988), "Money, Prices, and Balance of Payments in Malaysia," The
Indian Economic Journal, vol. 36, No. 1, July-September, 33-47.
39TABLE 1 - Cointegration  Results: Money Demand
Countryl  Rank  Cointegrating Relations
Vector  Name  (standard error in parentheses)
Chile'  3












DenECMrM2  (m..p) =-0.0207*Ap  + y + 0.064*1o-  0.0 6 4* 1A-  0.19*CapConDum
(0.0029)  (0.007)  (0.041)
DenECMinfl  Ap= 0.007*y + 0.002*10  - 0. 0 0 0 9 *1 A - 0.00002*t -0.003*CapConDum
(0.002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0000)  (0.0009)
Japan
3 1




KenECMnM2  m  = p + y + -0.2 35 *1A  + 0.0174*t
(0.006)  (0.003)
KenECMgdp  y=  0.065*10+ 0.0006*t
(0.005)  (0.0005)




MysECMrM2  (m-p) = -0.25*Ap + y
MysECMytrend  y= 0.008*t
(0.0001)






UruECMrM2  (m-p)  =  - 0.0172*Ap  + y + 0.018*10  + 0.0027*t
I______  (0.0028)  (0.003)  (0.0006)
This  table reports  the restricted  cointegrating  relations  found  for the monetary  sector.  Johansen's  (1988)  methodlology
was used to determine  the number  of cointegrating  vectors  and to test parameter  restrictions  on these  vectors.
Definition  of variables:  m represents  the  log of M2, p  is the log of CPI, y is the log  of a measure  of income
(usually  industrial  production),  1  is the  own rate  of money,  P4  is the alternative  (outside)  rate, and  t is a time  trend.
' Dummies for Dec.79, Jun.82, July82, Sept.84 and Oct.84 were included as unrestricted variables in the cointegration. See Table A.S.
2 The following dummies were included as unrestricted variables: DVAT, DPRSTOP, DCOTAX, D92Q4, D83Q1, D83Q2, Dec.92,
Jun.93, Jul.93, Aug.93. See Table A.S.
'The  following dummies were included as unrestricted variables: May90, Apr.90, Apr.89, and Apr.97. See Table A.5.
4  The following dummies were included as unrestricted variables: Feb.80, Jul.81, Mar.88, Mar.93. See Table A.S.
'The  following dummies were included as unrestricted variables: Jan.84, Feb.84, Mar.84. See Table A.5.
6 The following dummies were included as unrestricted variables: Nov.82, Dec.82, Dec.87, Jan.88, Nov.89, Dec.89, Jan.90, and Dec.92.
See Table A.5.TABLE  2 - Cointegration  Results:  Wages
Country! Vector Name  Rank  Cointegrating Relations (standard error in parentheses)
Chile'  I
ChiECMrwage  (w-p)  -0.0104*Ap - 0.2279*u  - 0.0016*t
(0.0018)  (0.0428)  (0.0004)
Colombia"  I
ColECMnwage  w = p + 0.0012*t
(0.0001)
Denmark 9
DenECMrwage  (w-p) =-0.0424*Ap  - 1.26*u  + 0.0027*t
(0.0242)  (0.293) (0.001)
Japanl 0
JapECMrwage  (w-p) =-0.0294*Ap  + 0.0066*DJuneT  - 0.0066*DJulyT + 0.0008*t
(0.0085)  (0.0008)  (0.0002)
Uruguay"'  1
UruECMrwage  (w-p)  = -0.0025*Ap  - 0.3483*u
________________  (0.0006)  (0.0486)
This table reports the restricted cointegrating relations found for the labor sector. Johansen's (1988) methodology
was used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors and to test parameter restrictions on these vectors.
Definition of Variables: w is the log of wages, p represents the log of CPI, u is the log of the unemployment rate,
and t is a time trend.
7 The following dummies were included in the cointegration analysis as unrestricted variables: Jun.82, Jul.82, Sep.84, and Oct.84. See Table A.5.
s The seasonal dummies included in this cointegration are centered seasonals. In addition, each centered seasonal is interacted with a dummy
variable for 1990. See Table A.5.
9 The following dummies were included as unrestricted variables: DumVAT, DumPRSTOP, and DumCOTAX. See Table A.5.
10 The following two dummies enter as unrestricted variables: Apr.89 and Apr.97. See Table A.5.
" The following dummies were included as unrestricted variables: Nov.82, Dec.82,Dec.87, Jan.88, Nov.89, Dec.89,
Jan.90, and Dec.92. See Table A.5.TABLE  3 - Cointegration  Results:  External  Sector
Country!  Rank  Cointegrating Relations
Vector Name  (standard error in parentheses)
Chile'  1I
ChiECMrPPP  (p-e)  = -0.0506*Ap  + p
(0.0083)
Colombia  3




DenECMrPPP  (p-e) = -0.0097*Ap  + p
(0.0022)




JapECMrPPP  (p-e) = -0. 1644*Ap + p* + 0.0046*t
(0.0178)  (0.0005)
JapECMuip  r  = I  + Ap + 0.0237*t
(0.005)
Kenya  2
KenECMnPPP  p =  e + p* + 4.016*1 - 4.016*1* - 0.337*t
(0.013)  (0.062)
KenECMidiff  I =  1.05*1  + 0.084*t
(0.016)
Malaysia' 5 I
MysECMrPPP  (p-e)  = 0.2696*Ap  +p-
(0.0529)
Uruguay  2
UruECMrPPP  (p-e) = 0.007 4 *Ap + p* + 0.0058*t
(0.0026)  (3.1293)
UruECMuip  1= Ap + I*  -0.0487*t
(0.0181)
This table reports the restricted cointegrating relations found for the external sector. Johansen's (1988) methodology
was used to determine the number of cointegrating vectors and to test parameter restrictions on these vectors.
Definition of Variables: p represents the log of CPI, e is the log of the exchange rate (usually expressed as units
of national currency per US$), I is the domestic interest rate, I* represents the foreign interest rate, p * represents
the log of the foreign price level (CPI), and t is a time trend.
12  The following dummies were included in the cointegration analysis as unrestricted variables: Jun.82, Jul.82, Sep.84, and Oct.84. See Table
A.5.
13 A dummy for capital controls (dumcapcon) was allowed to enter as a restricted variable in the cointegration space. The following dummies
were included unrestricted: DVAT, DPRSTOP, DCOTAX, D924, 83QI, 83Q2, Dec.92, Jun.93, Jul.93, and Aug.93. See Table A.5.
4 The following two dummies were included as unrestricted variables: Apr.89 and Apr.97. See Table A.5.
s The following dummies were included as unrestricted variables: Jan.84, Feb.84, Mar.84. See Table A.5.TABLE 4 - CHILE: Single Equation for Money (Modeling A(m -
Variable  Coff icient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instabilit
Constant  -0.069  0.103  -0.676  0.12
A(m  - p)t_ I  -0.130  0.069  -1.897  0.41
A2pA  -1.002  0.244  -4.103  0.08
Ay,  0.085  0.041  2.089  0.04
A 0 0.001  0.000  3.687  0.11
Ae,  0.031  0.098  0.319  0.05
chiECMrM2,1  -0.050  0.009  -5.789  0.13
chiECMytrend,-.  0.085  0.024  3.593  0.12
chiECMIownt- 1 0.007  0.000  3.697  0.15
Sample: 1978:10-1993:11
R2 =0.593958  F(24,157) =9.5691  [0.00001  c=0.0231
AR 1- 7 F( 7,150)  =  0.36271 [0.9226]
ARCH 7 F( 7,143)  =  0.3335  [0.9376]
Normality Chi2(2)  =  1.0704 [0.5855]
HETERO  F(32,124)  =  0.57818 [0.9629]
Hansen Instability  Test Results:  Variance:  0.163305 Joint  (variance  & coefficients): 3.99966
F-CRISIS  (80, 77) = 1.3427 [0.0975]
FIGURE 4 - CHILE: Recursive estimation for money demand
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'For  a list of and explanation for the dummies used in estimation, see Table A.5.TABLE  5 - COLOMBIA:  Single  Equation  for Money  (Modeling  Am )_
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instabiiy
Constant  0.334  0.070  4.743  0.16
Am, - 1  0.139  0.071  1.952  0.70*
AP,  _  6  -0.274  0.152  -1.806  0.09
Ay,  0.032  0.023  1.356  0.35
AIO  0.001  0.001  1.366  0.26
Ae, - 3 0.121  0.065  1.868  0.54*
Ae,  4  -0.184  0.066  -2.765  0.54*
Aet -12  -0.136  0.066  -2.066  0.25
colECMnM2,1 -0.043  0.011  -3.891  0.17
colECMIown,- 1 -0.000  0.000  -0.529  0.15
Sample: 1982:3-1998:6
R =0.584623  F(20,175)  12.315 [0.0000]  a=0.0 1223
AR l- 7 F( 7,168)  =  0.98872 [0.4412]
ARCH 7  F( 7,161)  =  0.88705 [0.5182]
Normality Chi2(2)  =  5.9558  [0.0509]
HETERO F(29,145)  =  1.4148  [0.09481
Hansen Instability  Test Results: Variance:  0.713604* Joint  (variance  & coefficients): 4.75832
F-CRISIS (70,105) =  0.57249 [0.9933]
FIGURE 5a - COLOMBIA:  Recursive estimation for money demand
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' For a list of and explanation for the dummies used in the estimation, see Table A.5.
* Denotes significance at 5%.COLOMBIA:  Single Equation  for Money (Modeling  Am),  continued
For Sub-sample:  1982  (3) to 1989  (12)
Hansen Instability Test Results: Variance: 0.0860424  Joint (variance  & coefficients):  4.29042
FIGURE 5b - COLOMBIA:  Recursive  estimation  for money demand
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1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990TABLE  6 - DENMARK:  Single  Equation  for Money  (Modeling  A(m  - pW
Variable  Coeffcient  Std  Error  t-value  Hansen InstalijJ
Constant  0.561  0.181  3.107  0.06
A(m - p)  -0.410  0.062  -6.611  0.07
A(m-  p)  10.178  0.056  3.193  0.11
A(.  - p)  10.385  0.062  6.228  0.21
A(m-  p)  0.199  0.065  3.053  0.04
A2  p  -. 0.685  0.198  -3.456  0.1
2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A2p_  5  -0.288  0.160  -1.809  0.24
Ay, 1 0.024  0.030  0.809  0.43
AI0 =  .0004  0.003  -1.262  0.06
AA  -0.005  0.002  -2.984  0.1 1
Ae,  0.301  0.133  -2.262  0.05
denECMrM2,- 1 -0.029  0.010  -2.842  0.06
denECMinflt-l  .0.002  0.006  -0.345  0.06
Sample:  1977:3-1993:12
R2 =0.886042  F(33,168)  39.583  10.0000]  as-0.0116
AR  1- 7 F( 7,161)  1.4047  [0.2068]
ARCH 7  F( 7,154)  1.383  [0.2162]
Normality  Chi2(2)  3.5022  [0.1736]
HETERO  F(46,121)  0.70941  [0.9070]
Hansen Instability Test Results: Variance: 0.101549 Joint (variance & coefficients): 4.23773
F-CRISIS (68,100) =  1.1544 [0.2544]
FIGURE 6 - DENMARK: Recursive estimation for money demand
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For  a list of aDd explanation  for  the dummies  used in the estimation,  see  Table A.5.TABLE  7 - JAPAN:  Single  Equation  for Money  (Modeling  A(m - p)),
Variable  Coefficient  StdL  Error  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  0.047  0.006  7.808  0.18
A(m  - p),  -0.251  0.058  4.320  0.35
A(m  - p),  0.116  0.049  2.395  0.1
A(m - p),  0.209  0.049  4.273  0.04
A(m - p), 6 0.185  0.051  3.635  0.09
A(m-p),_ 9 0.197  0.050  3.965  0.06
A(m- p),  10 -0.119  0.051  -2.317  0.17
^2 pt  -0.895  0.108  -8.254  0.23
A2p  -12  -0.190  0.075  -2.520  0.05
Ayt  -0.079  0.026  -3.013  0.36
[A  -0.000  0.002  -0.130  0.23
AJ,
0 0.002  0.002  1.004  0.4
japECMrm2,1 -0.012  0.002  -7.595  0.15
Sample:  1978:4-1997:12
R2 = 0.681371  F(27,209) =  16.553 [0.0000]  a=0.0056
AR 1- 7 F( 7,202)  =  3.4515  [0.0016]**
ARCH 7  F( 7,195)  =  0.47052  [0.8551]
Normality Chi2(2)  =  1.3498 [0.5092]
HETERO F(39,169)  =  1.4382  [0.0608]
Hansen Instability  Test Results: Variance:  0.188812 Joint  (variance & coefficients): 3.49508
F-CRISIS (93,116) =  1.334 [0.0704]
FIGURE 7 - JAPAN: Recursive estimation for money demand
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'For  a list of and explanation  for the dummies  used  in estimation,  see Table  A.5.
** Denotes  significance  at 1%.TABLE  8 - KENYA:  Single  Equation  for Money  (Modeling  Am )'
Variable  Coe  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instabia-y
Constant  4.498  0.978  4.597  0.12
Am, - 1  -0.168  0.058  -2.922  0.2
Am,  - 3  0.231  0.056  4.162  0.16
Ap,  0.129  0.098  1.325  0.1
Ay,  -1.522  0.870  -1.750  0.07
AP,  -0.002  0.001  t  -3.813  0.1
A_ 2 -0.002  0.001  -2.435  0.02
A]O  0.010  0.002  j  4.762  0.11
2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Ae,  - 2 -0.139  0.056  -2.495  0.05
Aet  - 3  -0.148  0.055  -2.663  0.39
KenECMnM2,1 -0.065  0.014  -4.616  0.08
KenECMgdpt- 1 -0.191  0.041  -4.580  0.12
KenECMispr,  1 -0.016  0.003  -4.639  0.03
Sample: 1977:2-1996:12
2 = 0.473089  F(30,208)  6.2251 [0.00001  a=0.0201
AR 1- 7 F( 7,201)  =  1.2203  [0.2930]
ARCH 7  F(7,194)  =  1.3342  [0.2360]
Normality Chi2(2)  =  0.33438 [0.8460]
HETERO  F(42,165)  =  0.69782 [0.91411
Hansen Instability Tests Results: Variance: 0.095519 Joint (variance & coefficients): 3.70518
F-CRISIS  (58,106) =  1.0628 [0.3873]
FIGURE  8 - KENYA:  Recursive  estimation  for money  demand
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'For  a list of and explanation for the dummies used in estimation, see Table A.5.TABLE 9 - MALAYSIA: Single Equation  for Money (Modeling  A(m - p) )A
Variable  Coefcient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  -0.088  0.073  -1.205  0.09
A(m - p)  -0.206  0.075  -2.763  0.34
Np 1 -0.788  0.302  -2.614  0.14
A  2At  12  -0.478  0.203  -2.350  0.09
Ay 1 0.053  0.022  2.397  0.13
AI°  -0.001  0.004  -0.165  0.1
AP,  -0.004  0.003  -1.278  0.14
Ae,  -0.034  0.093  -0.369  0.07
MysECMrM2,1 -0.003  0.001  -3.001  0.09
MysECMytrend 1 -.  0.039  0.021  1.832  0.09
MysECMIalt,- 1 -0.002  0.003  -0.766  0.11
MysECMIown,. 1 0.004  0.003  1.406  0.11
Sample: 1980:8-1996:12
R
2 = 0.447342  F(25,171) =  5.5365 [0.0000]  a=0.0132
AR 1- 7 F( 7,164)  0.21144 [0.9825]
ARCH 7  F( 7,157)  1.881 [0.07603
Normality Chi2(2)  1.1753 [0.5556]
HETERO  F(36,134)  0.96657 [0.5303]
Hansen  Instability  Test  Results:  Variance:  0.221976  Joint  (variance  and coefficients):  4.65502
F-CRISIS(48,123) =  0.66033 [0.9483]
FGIGRE  9 - MALAYSIA:  Recursive  estimation  for  money  demand
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'For  a list of and explanation  for  the dummies used in estimation, see Table A.5.TABLE  10 - URUGUAY:  Single  Equation  for Money  (Modeling  A(m - A)
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  0.529  0.067  7.846  0.27
A(m  - p)t - 2  0.132  0.037  3.578  0.07
A(m-p)t-6  0.109  0.036  3.022  0.2
A(m  - P)t -12  0.133  0.041  3.205  0.2
A 2
p  -0.875  0.094  -9.313  0.07
A 2
-- 0.187  0.068  -2.742  0.08
A
2
8  -0.169  0.077  -2.191  0.02
A2A-,  .- 0.238  0.084  -2.831  0.1
A2pi-to  -0.472  0.094  -4.998  0.04
A2p  -0.351  0.092  -3.830  0.12
A2P,_12  -0.158  0.068  -2.322  0.07
Ay,  0.066  0.042  1.565  0.28
AI( 77  0.001  0.000  2.189  0.1
Ae,  0.483  0.065  7.424  0.4
Ae,  1  -0.382  0.032  -11.960  0.23
Ae,  2  0.084  0.024  3.471  0.69*
Aef_4  -0.071  0.020  -3.493  0.12
Aef 8  -0.060  0.022  -2.777  0.19
UruECMrM2,  -0.040  0.006  -7.064  0.27
Sample: 1982:9-1997:12
R 2 = 0.897336  F(37,146) = 34.49 [0.0000]  a=0.0147
AR 1- 7 F( 7,139)  =  1.2385 [0.2858]
ARCH 7 F( 7,132)  =  1.4988 [0.1730]
Normality Chi2(2)  =  1.7613 [0.4145]
Xi^2  F(55, 90)  =  1.2694 [0.1562]
Hansen Instability test results: Variance: 0.226654 Joint (variance & coefficients): 4.96548
F-CRISIS (38,108)=  2.2689 [0.0005] **
; For a list of and explanation for the dummies used in estimation, see Table A.5.
**  Denotes significance at 1%.5  :  :::  ~~-  iN  I  . -N
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Country  Recursive  Least  Hansen  Test  F-Crisis
Squares
Chow Tests  Variance  Joint  Statistic  p-value
Chile  stablea  0.163  3.999  1.343  [0.09831
Colombia  I
Entire  Sample  unstable  0.714*  4.758  0.572  [0.993]
1982:3-1989.12  stablet  0.086  4.29
Denmark  stable  0.102  4.238  1.154  [0.254]
Japan  stable  0.189  3.495  1.334  [0.070}
Kenya  stable  0.096  3.705  1.063  [0.387]
Malaysia  stable  0.222  4.655  0.66  [0.948]
Uruguay  stablea  0.227  4.965  2.269  [°0.  001]**
a The recursive estimation does not include the crisis period.
b The overall instability in the sample comes from the period after the crisis.
*,**  Denotes significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 12: Summary  Table  for Price Equation  Stability  Tests
Country  Recursive  Least  Hansen  Test  F-Crisis
Squares
Chow  Tests  Variance  Joint  Statistic  p-value
Chile  Stable  0.298  5.674  0.963  [0.565;
Colombia  Stablea  1.035*  6.754  2.545  [0.000]**
Denmark|  Stable  0.259  4.813  0.754  [0.8881
Japan  Stable  0.523*  7.961  0.855  [0.779]
Kenya
Entire Sample  Unstable  0.491*  4.327  1.439  [0.037]*
1980s  0.748  [0.884]
1990s  2.163  [0.001]**
Malaysia  Stable  0.355  5.315  0.736  [0.886]
Uruguay  Stablea  0.21  5.568  2.142  [0.001]**
a The recursive estimation does not include the crisis period.
*, ** Denotes significance at 5% and 1%,  respectively.TABLE 13-  CHILESingle  Equation for Prices (Mo  ing A2p)
Variable  _  Coeffiient  StdError  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  -0.077  0.072  -1.076  0.23
A2  PI  - 2  -0.175  0.058  -2.996  0.03
A2m, - 2  0.027  0.013  2.124  0.36
Ay,  -0.016  0.012  -1.331  0.1
Al °  -0.000  0.000  -2.438  0.1
MOI  6  -0.000  0.000  -2.346  0.09
Ae,  0.085  0.028  3.044  0.17
Ap,*  0.799  0.247  3.238  0.11
A 2 WI  -0.020  0.014  -1.427  0.05
Aut  -0.019  0.008  -2.383  0.06
ASp,  0.004  0.008  0.559  0.16
ChiECMrM2,-,  -0.000  0.005  -0.068  0.27
ChiECMytrendt-,  0.004  0.010  0.374  0.23
ChiECMIown, l  0.000  0.000  1.978  0.25
ChiECMrPPPt- 4 -0.009  0.003  -2.724  0.15
ChiECMrwaget  1 0.005  0.010  0.471  0.31
Sample: 1978:3-1993:11
R2= 0.724088  F(32,149) = 12.22 [0.00001
AR 1- 7 F( 7,142)  =  1.9657  [0.0638]
ARCH  7  F( 7,135)  =  0.72714 [0.6492]
Normality Chi2(2)  =  2.4586  [0.2925]
HETERO  F(47,101)  =  0.63269 [0.9591]
Hansen Instability Tests: Variance: 0.297906  Joint (variance & coefficients): 5.67416
F-CRISIS (77, 72)=  0.96332 [0.5648]
FIGURE  13 - CHILE: Recursive estimation for price equation
l  l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 r  .Inoys  |  -- ReslStep
.02  j0 
u2.-  0 i  4-W
-.02;  wt
1985  1990  1985  1990
5%  -- U  t  CHOWSI  __  %  --  -NdnCHOWs~
2 riF 
4  1  <  ,t.6
4-  4  ii  4  ~~~~i  t 
. 6  ,
1985  1990  1985  1990
* For a list of and explanation for the dummies used in estimation, see Table A.5.TABLE  14 - COLOMBIA:  Single  Equation  for Prices  (Modeling  4A)  _
Variable  Coeffiient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  -0.017  0.072  -0.234  0.04
Ap,  - 1  0.405  0.068  5.920  0.05
Ap,  - 0.213  0.074  2.864  0.05
Ap,  - 12  -0.263  0.074  -3.556  0.06
'AM,  1 0.006  0.034  0.164  0.18
Ay,  -0.000  0.011  -0.004  0.17
oAI  0.000  0.000  1.398  0.27
AJ*  -0.003  0.001  -2.811  0.03
51,*  7  -0.003  0.001  -2.706  0.22
Apt*- 2 0.389  0.247  1.572  0.12
Ap*-  3 0.743  0.295  2.514  0.09
)t*-  4  -0.404  0.257  -1.569  0.07
Ae,  0.003  0.028  0.122  0.03
Aw,  0.089  0.042  2.144  0.22
Au,  -0.000  0.010  -0.032  0.06
Asp,  0.007  0.006  1.215  0.25
Co1ECMnwage,- 1 0.034  0.020  1.737  0.04
ColECMnM2t-  -0.002  0.009  -0.216  0.04
ColECMIownt,I  0.000  0.000  1.102  0.04
Co1ECMnPPP,- 4 -0.006  0.003  -1.797  0.04
ColECMIfort, 1 -0.000  0.000  -0.685  0.04
Sample:  1982:3-1998:6
R2  = 0.762338  AR 1- 7 F( 7,146)  =  1.8252  [0.0866]
F(42,153)  = 11.685  [0.0000]  ARCH  7 F(7,139)  =  1.7248  [0.1079]
Normality  Chi2(2)  =  4.6588  [0.09741
HETERO F(63,  89)  =  1.3777  [0.0816]
Hansen  Instability  Test Results: Variance: 1.0347**  Joint (variance  & coefficients):  6.754
F-CRISIS  (70,83)=  2.5448  [0.0000]  **
FIGURE 14 - COLOMBIA: Recursive estimation for price equation
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4.For  a list  of and  explanation  for the duimmies  used  in estimation,  see  Table  A.5** Denotes  significance  at 1%.TABLE  15 - DENMARK:  Single  E luation  for Prices  Modeling  A2p)  _
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instabilit
Constant  0.091  0.049  1.844  0.05
A
2 P,  _  0.208  0.065  3.215  0.26
A2m,  12  0.024  0.009  2.720  0.55*
Ay,  0.014  0.007  1.949  0.19
0l  0.003  0.001  3.678  0.4
AJA  -0.000  0.001  -0.524  0.14
Ae,  0.008  0.035  0.218  0.1
Ap,*  0.330  0.088  3.738  0.26
A.J*  0.002  0.001  1.596  0.08
Au, -5 0.023  0.006  3.742  0.05
Au,  6  0.022  0.006  3.468  0.38
Au,  -12  0.025  0.006  3.889  0.09
A2w,  0.035  0.020  1.718  0.07
denECMrM2t- 1 -0.007  0.003  -2.505  0.05
denECMinfl,-,  -0.004  0.002  -2.408  0.06
denECMrwage,-,  -0.005  0.001  -3.187  0.05
denECMrPPP,.l  -0.025  0.008  -3.258  0.04
denECMuip,-,  0.000  0.000  J  2.998  0.06
Sample:  1977:3-1993:12
R2 = 0.852827  AR 1- 7 F( 7,149)  0.94918 [0.47071
F(45,156) = 20.088 [0.0000]  ARCH 7 F( 7,142)  1.3522 [0.2303]
Normality Chi2(2)  5.3779  [0.0680]
HETERO F(63, 92)  =  1.0987 [0.33681
Hansen Instability Test Results: Variance: 0.258881  Joint (variance & coefficients): 4.81306
F-CRISIS(68, 88)=  0.75377 [0.8878]
FIGURE 15 - DENMARK: Recursive estimation for price equation
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'For a list of and explanation for  the dummies  used in estimation, see Table A.S. * Denotes  significance  at 5%.TABLE  16 - JAPAN:  Single  Equation  for Prices  (Mod eling A2p)
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  0.005  0.010  0.459  0.22
A
2
Pt  -10o  -0.083  0.048  -1.730  0.38
A2p(  ,  -0.140  0.048  -2.897  0.39
A2m,  0.036  0.016  2.223  0.39
Ay,  0.032  0.013  2.463  0.04
AL(A-  6  0.002  0.001  2.919  0.06
AIti7t°2  -0.001  0.001  -1.917  0.07
Al 0I  I  -0.001  0.001  -2.345  0.19
AIt  -0.001  0.001  -1.843  0.13
A[,b5  -0.001  0.001  -2.187  0.13
Ae,  0.018  0.007  2.558  0.25
Ae,- 5 0.013  0.007  1.769  0.19
Ae,  7 0.015  0.007  2.005  0.44
A*  0,493  0.099  4.976  0.14
Ap,*6  -0,228  0.091  -2.500  0.05
Al?*  0.296  0.086  3.437  0.07
AI  -0.000  0.001  -0.238  0.06
A 2w,  0.008  0.005  1.621  0.22
Au,  -0.002  0.006  -0.322  0.36
Asp,  -0.001  0.005  -0.134  0.06
japECMrm2,- 1 -0.005  0.001  -3.587  0.22
japECMrPPP 1 4 -0.001  0.001  -1.684  0.26
japECMuip1i  0.000  0.000  3.106  0.08
japECMrwage,-,  0.004  0.002  2.070  0.07
Sample:  1978:4-1997:12  AR 1-  7 F(7,189)  =  1.5956  [0.1389]
R2= 0.860978  ARCH  7 F( 7,182)  =  0.36205  [0.9232]
F(40,196)  = 30.346  [0.0000]  Normality  Chi 2(2)  =  1.1212  [0.5709]
HETERO  F(65,130)  =  0.71114  [0.9365]
Hansen  Instability  Test  Results:  Variance:  0.523257*  Joint  (variance  & coefficients):  7.96058
F-CRISIS (93,103)=  0.85501 [0.77861
FIGURE  16  - JAPAN:  Recursive  estimation  for  price  equation
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|  1985  1990}  1995  1985  1990  1995TABLE 17 - KENYA: Single E  uation for Prices (Mod1eling  Ap)
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  -0.982  0.477  -2.058  0.06
AP'  - 3  0.093  0.040  2.342  0.01
AA - 4  -0.107  0.038  -2.823  0.19
Ap, - 0.091  0.045  2.005  0.04
Am,  3  0.046  0.022  2.054  0.04
Am, - 4  0.070  0.022  3.161  0.19
Ay,  -0.034  0.391  -0.086  0.15
Al,  0.001  0.000  2.108  0.02
AlA  0.001  0.000  4.367  0.15
AlI 0 0.002  0.001  2.350  0.02
AI, 0 -0.003  0.001  -3.753  0.08
AIT,  0.004  0.001  5.010  0.04
Al*  0.001  0.001  1.265  0.07
Ae,  0.047  0.019  2.411  0.01
Ap_  2  0.656  0.234  2.807  0.06
kenECMnM2W-  0.009  0.007  1.441  0.08
kenECMgdp,l  0.040  0.020  2.017  0.06
kenECMispr,  1 0.003  0.002  2.119  0.09
kenECMnPPP,l  -0.004  0.003  -1.603  0.02
kenECMidiff,_  -0.016  0.010  -1.568  0.03
Sample:  1977:2-1997:12
R2  = 0.833408  AR 1- 7 F( 7,188)  =  0.37837  [0.9142]
F(43,195)  = 22.687  [0.0000]  ARCH  7 F(7,181)  =  0.82656  10.5664]
Nonnality  Chi 2(2)  =  4.7828 [0.0915]
HETERO F(62,132)  =  1.211  [0.1807]
Hansen  Instability  Test Results:  Variance:  0.491027* Joint  (variance  & coefficients):  4.32741
F-CRISIS-80s(58,  96)  =  0.74783  [0.8841]
F-CRISIS-90s(41,  96)  =  2.1629  [0.0011]  **
FIGURE  17 - KENYA: Recursive estimation for price equation
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1985  1990  1995  1985  1990  1995TABLE  18 - MALAYSIA:  Single  E  uation  for Prices  Modeling  A  _p)  _
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  0.009  0.027  0.337  0.27
A
2pt  _ 1  -0.164  0.063  -2.596  0.04
A m,  l  0.008  0.011  0.762  0.45
Ay,  -0.007  0.005  -1.378  0.04
°AI'  0.000  0.001  0.256  0.07
Al4A  -0.001  0.001  -2.679  0.06
Ae,  0.050  0.022  2.283  0.21
Ae,  - 3  -0.058  0.021  -2.841  0.3
Ae,  _ 5  0.065  0.020  3.302  0.31
0.399  0.108  3.704  0.16
MysECMrM2t- 1 -0.002  0.001  -1.213  0.23
MysECMytrendt- 1 0.004  0.005  0.832  0.27
MysECM1alt,  l  0.000  0.001  0.250  0.3
MysECMlown,_ 1 -0.000  0.001  -0.004  0.31
MysECMrPPPt-.  0.001  0.001  0.559  0.09
Sample:1980:8-1996:12
R2 = 0.703996  F(26,170)  15.551  [0.0000]
AR  1- 7  F(  7,163  =  0.80692  [0.5827]
ARCH 7  F(7,156)  =  1.0472  [0.4006]
Normnality  Chi
2(2)  =  4.9951  [0.0823]
1BETERO  F(40,129)  =  1.4135  [0.07611
Hansen  Instability  Test  Results:  Variance:  0.354895  Joint  (variance  &  coefficients):  5.31541
F-CRISIS  (48,122)  =  0.7358  [0.8858]
FIGURE  18 - MALAYSIA: Recursive estimation for price equation
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For  a list  of and  explanation  for  the  dummies  used  in  estimation,  see  Table  A.5TABLE  19 - URUGUAY: Single  Equation  for Prices  (Modeling  A2p)  _
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-value  Hansen Instability
Constant  0.019  0.104  0.188  0.17
A
2p  -i  -0.306  0.123  -2.491  0.16
A 2 pI  -2  -0.385  0.098  -3.920  0.05
A
2pP  _  -0.214  0.087  -2.473  0.04
A
2
pI  - 4  -0.190  0.069  -2.760  0.32
A
2 p  - 5 -0.238  0.050  -4.733  0.03
A
2
pt  - 7  -0.168  0.039  -4.301  0.18
A
2 m,  5  0.093  0.022  4.175  0.12
A 2 m, - 6  0.090  0.028  3.264  0.19
A
2 m  _ 7  0.105  0.028  3.691  0.09
A2m, - 8  0.080  0.025  3.185  0.07
A
2 m,  9  0.050  0.020  2.446  0.07
Ay, - 4  0.039  0.017  2.365  0.69*
A1 0 0.001  0.000  2.877  0.05
AP,  -0.001  0.000  -3.516  0.03
Al?- 8 -0.001  0.000  -2.880  0.13
Au, - 1  -0.051  0.012  -4.158  0.1
Au,  -2  0.053  0.013  4.125  0.1
AU,  - 3  -0.066  0.015  -4.430  0.08
Au, _ 6  -0.039  0.014  -2.775  0.15
AU- 7 0.031  0.012  2.568  0.09
A2w,  0.151  0.022  6.965  0.23
A2w,  0.110  0.020  5.578  0.56*
Ae,  0.107  0.048  -2.240  0.04
Ae,  0.118  0.018  6.663  0.04
Ap*  1.053  0.409  2.575  0.11
A,*  0.008  0.002  3.726  0.1
AI,*9  0.005  0.002  2.557  0.2
uruECMrPPPt- 1 -0.003  0.004  -0.774  0.1
uruECMuipt  . 0.000  0.000  3.332  0.12
uruECMrM2  1 0.001  0.008  0.105  0.17
uruECMrwage,l  0.026  0.017  1.476  0.17
Sample: 1982:9-1997:12
R2= 0.875851  F(39,144) = 26.049 [0.0000]
AR 1- 7 F( 7,137)  =  0.95472 [0.4670]
ARCH 7  F(7,130)  =  0.75209 [0.62841
Normality Chi2(2)  =  0.24055 [0.8867]
HETERO  F(70, 73)  =  1.1522 [0.2748]
Hansen Instability Test Results: Variance: 0.210029  Joint (variance & coefficients): 5.56761
F-CRISIS  (38,106)  =  2.1422  [0.00121  **
'For  a list of and explanation for the dummies used in estimation, see Table A.5.
*,** Denotes significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.URUGUAY:  Single  Equation  for Price  (Modeling  A2p), continulled
FIGURE  19 - URUGUAY:  Recursive  estimation  for price equation
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1990  1995  1990  1995TABLE  20 - CHILE:  Price  equation  with crisis interactionst
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  Interacted Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error
Constant  -0.123  0.099  _
A  pi-2  -0.105  0.095  A 2 p  2*crisisdummy  -0.062  0.111
A 2m,  2  0.036 *  0.017  A2m, - 2 *crsi  dummy  -0.017  0.025
Ay,  -0.011  0.014  Ay, *crisis dummy  -0.016  0.013
AIJ°  -0.0001  0.0001  AI,0  5 *crisis dummy  -0.0001  0.0001
AI-  6  -0.0002 *  0.0001  Al  _  6 *crisis dummy  0.0001  0.0001
Ae,  0.09  0.057  Ae, *crisis dummy  -0.026  0.068
Ap,*  0.978 **  0.316  Ap* *crisis dummy  -0.167  0.413
A  w,  A,  *crisis dummy
Au,  -0.019  0.012  Aut *crisis dummy  0.002  0.015
Asp,  -0.002  0.011  Asp,  *crisis dummy  0.009  0.017
chiECMrM2t,-  0.001  0.008  ChiECMrM2,-. *crisis dummy  0.004  0.007
chiECMytrend- ,  0.015  0.014  ChiECMytrend 1-1*  crisis dummy  -0.016  0.009
chiECMlown,  -.  0.00002  0.0001  ChiECMlownti,*crisis dummy  0.0001  0.0001
chiECMrPPP  -,  -0.009  *  0.004  ChiECMrPPP, 1 *  crisis  dummy  -0.005  0.003
chiECMrwaget-I 1 -0.007  0.014  ChiECMrwage,- 1*crisis dummy  0.019  0.02
tCrisis  dummy  equals one for the period  1981(1) - 1987(12) and it is zero otherwise.
TABLE  21 - COLOMBIA:  Price  equation  with crisis interactionst  _-
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  Interacted Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error
Constant  -0.303*  0.119
Apt - 0.388**  0.099  Ap,  - *crisis dummy  -0.023  0.121
Apt - ,  0.143  0.109  Ap,  - *crisis dummy  0.092  0.119
Ap,  -12  -0.258*  0.11  ZP, - 12 *crisis dummy  -0.029  0.118
Am,  1 0.004  0.039  Am, 1 -,  *crisisdummy  -0.116  0.088
AY,  -0.013  0.013  Ay, *crisis dummy  -0.004  0.017
AIl'  0.001  0.0004  I*  *crisis dummy  -0.001  0.001
A*  -0.002  0.003  Ai,  *crisis dummy  -0.000  0.003
!  Al,  7  - .- 0.003  0.002  A1,'  7  *crisis  dummy  -0.0004  0.002
Apt*-  2 -0.304  0.383  4p- 2 *crisis dummy  0.967  0.519
Ap*3 0.588  0.399  4p  3 *crisisdummy  0.138  0.571
472,- 4  -0.341  0.37  4*crisisdummy  0.107  0.483
Ae,  0.036  0.031  Ae, *crisis dummy  -0.043  0.119
Aw,  0.117*  0.049  Aw, *crisis dummy  -0.081  0.111
Au,  -0.009  0.012  Au,  *crisis dummy  0.031  0.022
Asp,  0.013  0.007  Asp, *crisis dummy  -0.013  0.019
ColECMnwage,-  0.042  0.03  ColECMnwage,-, *crisis dummy  -0.005  -0.095
CoIECMnM2,-  0.026 *  0.013  ColECMnM2,-*crisis  dummy  0.006  0.010
ColECMIown,-,  0.0001  0.001  ColECMIown,-_*crisis dummy  0.001  0.001
ColECMnPPP,-,  -0.025 **  0.009  ColECMnPPP, ,*crisis dummy  0.010  0.D11
ColECMIfor,_,  -0.000  0.001  Co1ECMIfor,  *crisis  dummy  0.001  0.001
tCrisis  dummy  equals  one for the period  1982(1) - 1987(12) and it is zero otherwise.
*  Denotes  significance  at the 5% level.**  Denotes  significance  at the  1% level.TABLE  22 - DENMARK:  Price  equation  with crisis interactions
t
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  Interacted  Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error
Constant  0.108  0.056
t2  p!  _ !  | ~0.233**  0.073  2p  *rssdmY-0.003  0.132 ,-,  .73A  p 1 ~crisis  dummy
-2  n12  0.006  i  0.011  A 2 m,  12*crisis  dummy  0.009  0.011
AV, - 5  0.011  0.009  Ay,  _5 *crisis  dummy  0.015  0.019
AnsI',  ~  ~  0.003**  0.001  AI°  *crisis  dummy  -0.001  0.002
IAJ. 4 -0.001  0.001  AA  *  dm  0.001  0.002
1~~~~~~~~~~~~P  *crisis dummy
Ac,  0.014  0.039  Ae  *crisis dummy  0.033  0.124
0.345**  0.11  . 0.060  0.173
Apy  _Ap 1 *crisis  dummy
_J*  0.002 *  0.001  *  . d  -0.004  0.002
Au  0  Au 1 *crisis dummy
Al, - 5  0.02  **  0.007  Au, -5 *crisis dummy  -0.0002  0.009
Au, - _ 1 0.022 **  0.007  Au, 2 6 *crisis dummy  -0.008  0.009
Llq-12  ~0.027  **  0.007  Au,  -2 * crisis  dummy  -0.006  0.010
A2  W,  0.048 *  0.022  A2w, *crisis dummy  0.004  0.022
DenECMrM2,-,  -0.009 **  0.003  denECMrM2, ,*crisis dummy  0.003  0.002
DenECMinfl,.,  -0.005 *  0.002  denECMinfl  [-I *crisis dummy  -0.005  0.009
DenECMrwage,-,  -0.003  0.002  denECMrwage,-j *crisis dummy  0.001  0.005
DenECMrPPPt.,  -0.041 **  0.011  denECMrPPP-,j*crisis dummy  0.042  0.031
DenECMuip,  1  0.0002 *  0.0001  denECMuip,  *crisis  dummy  0.001  0.0005
iCrisis dummy equals one for the period 1987(1) - 1992(12) and it is zero otherwise.
TABLE 23 - JAPAN:  Price equation  with crisis interactionst
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  Interacted Variable  Coefficient  StdError I  Constant  -0.005  0.012
2  -0.100 *  0.051  A
2
p,  _  *crisis dummy  0.265 **  0.089
A2A  t  -0.171  **  0.052  A
2p,  ,  *crisis dummy  0.261 **  0.091
Am,  0079**  0.024  A
2
M,,  *crisis  dummy  -0.089**  0.033
Ay,  0.018  0.019  Ay,  *crisisdummy  0.013  0.026
I  A  6  A  0.002  0.001  AA  *crisis dummy  0.001  0.002
A3  0 tI  2  |-0.001  *  0.001  L,I  *crisisdummy  -0.003  0.002
[  AI7  T  -0.001 *  0.001  A1I,°  ,,  *crisis  dummy  -0.0001  0.002
A  b,b  -0.002 *  0.001  AI1b  *crisis dummy  0.002  0.001
A3
, i  T  -0.002 **  0.001  AIb  *crisis dummy  0.002  0.001
Ae, - 2  0.024 **  0.009  Ae,  2 *crisis  dummy  -0.019  0.016
Ae, - 5  0.022 *  0.009  Ae,  -5 *crisis dummy  -0.019  0.015
Ae,  7  0.016  0.009  Ae 1 *crisis dummy  -0.009  0.015
*t  - 2  |  0.516**  0.109  -0.071  0.223
Ap-  2 An________  -2  * crisis  dummy  -. 7  .2
Ap  -0.279 *  0.107  Ap  6 *crisis dummy  0.174  0.219
t*g  t  0.305  0.094  l* 
5 risis dummy  -0.122  0.211
Al,  -0.0001  0.001  M**erisisdummy  0.001  0.002
A
2W,  0.008  0.005  A
2w, *crisis  dummy  0.0002  0.001
Au  ,  -0.001  0.007  Au, *crisis dummy  -0.011  0.012
Asp,  -0.011  0.009  Asp *crisis dummy  0.011  0.011
JapECMrm21,-  -0.003  0.002  japECMrm2,-1 *crisis dummy  0.001  0.002
sJapECMrPPP  - |  -0.002*  0.001  japECMrPPP, -*crisis dummy  0.001  0.001
JapECMuip,-,  0.001 **  0.0002  japECMuip11*crisis dummy  0.0001  0.0004
LJapECMrwageL  0.006  0.003  japECMrwage,-*crisis  dummy  -0.001  0.001
tCrisis dummy equals one forthe  period 1990(1)-  1997(12) and it is zero otherwise.TABLE  24 - KENYA:  Price  equation  with  crisis interactionst
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  Interacted Variable  Coefficientf  Std.Error
Constant  -0.496  0.694
Ap,  - 0.039  0.061  Ap, -3  *crisis dummy  0.081  0.082
Ap,  - 4  0.012  0.063  Ap, - 4  *crisis  dummy  -0.114  0.083
Ap,  - 8  0.144  *  0.059  Ap,  - 8  *crisis  dummy  -0.128  0.094
Am,  - 0.036  0.025  Am,  - *crisis dummy  -0.022  0.055
At  -, 4  0.049  0.026  Am, - 4  *crisis dummy  0.073  0.055
Ay,  0.165  0.481  Ayt *crisis dummy  -5.081 **  1.791
AiA  0.001  0.001  AlA *crisis dummy  -0.001  0.001
A-  0.0004  0.001  AI,  *crisis dummy  0.001  0.001
AI' 0 0.001  0.001  A)' 0 *crisisdummy  0.002  0.002
A, 0 -0.002  0.002  AI02  *crisis dummy  -0.002  0.002
A10
6  0.003 *  0.001  AI)'  *crisis dummy  0.002  0.002
A'Vt  0.001  0.001  Als  *crisis  dummy  0.031 **  0.012
Ae,  0.025  0.033  Ae, *crisis dummy  0.047  0.044
Ap  t  - 2  0.633*  0.254  Ap  2 *crisis dummy  0.379  1.098
kenECMnM2 -,  0.005  0.009  kenECMnM2,-, *crisis dummy  -0.018  0.019
kenECMgdp,,  0.020  0.029  kenECMgdpt-,*crisis dummy  -0.012  0.007
kenECMispr ,-,  0.003  0.002  kenECMispr ,-,*crisis dummy  -0.002  0.001
kenECMnPPP  t  -0.002  0.003  kenECMnPPP,.-, *crisis dummy  -0.054 *  0.022
kenECMidiff, ,  |  -0.006  0.012  kenECMidiff,t-I*crisis dummy  -0.214 *  0.087
tCrisis dummy equals one for the period 1992(1) - 1995(12) and it is zero otherwise
TABLE 25 - MALAYSIA:  Price equation with crisis  interactionst
Variable  Coeff  icient  Std. Error  Interacted Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error
Constant  0.016  0.028
A  2Pt  - I  -0.153*  0.068  A  2
2p  *crisisdummy  0.139  0.168
|  A2M,  l  t0.002  0.011  A2m, .*crisis  dummy  0.038  0.033
AY,  -0.009  0.006  Ay, *crisis dummy  -0.002  0.011
AIl?0  -0.001  0.001  Alo  *crisis dummy  0.002  0.001
A_  2  -0.002 **  0.001  AIA  *crisis dummy  0.001  0.001
Ae,  0.061 *  0.025  Ae, *crisis dummy  -0.029  0.053
Ae, -3  -0.052 *  0.023  Ae, - *crisis dummy  -0.007  0.056
Ae,  - 5  0.038  0.022  Ae, - *crisis dummy  0.127 *  0.053
Ap,*-  0.399 **  0.124  Ap*  *crisis dummy  -0.149  0.277
mysECMrM2 t  0-  0  -°-°°1  0.001  mysECMrM2 t_,*crisis  dummy  0.001  0.003
mysECMytrend, -,  0.001  0.005  mysECMytrend, ,- *crisis dummy  -0.002  0.013
mysECMIalt t-  0.001  0.001  mysECMIalt t-,*crisis dummy  -0.002  0.002
mysECMIown t-1  -0.001  0.001  mysECMIown t-,*crisis dummy  0.002  0.002
mysECMrPPP ,-  0.001  0.001  mysECMrPPP t_,*crisis dummy  0.001  0.003
ICrisis dummy equals one for the period 1985(1) - 1988(12)  and it is zero otherwise
*  Denotes significance at the 5% level.
**  Denotes significance at the 1% level.TABLE 26-  URUGUAY: Price equation with crisis interactionst
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  Interacted Variabie  Coefficient  Std. Error
Constant  -0.13  0.119
A
2 p  -i  -0.213  0.185  A
2p  - *crisis dummy  -0.725 *  0.327
A
2pt  - 2  -0.246  0.167  A
2pI  - 2  *crisis dummy  -0.641 *  0.271
A 
2 pt  - 3  -0.056  0.145  A2p  3 *crisis dummy  -0.619 *  0.245
A2
p  0.038  0.115  A
2
p  *crisis dummy  -0.685 **  0.197
A
2pt  5 -0.044  0.071  A
2 p-  5 *crisis dummy  -0.521**  0.155
A
2 pr  - 7  -0.159 **  .0546  A
2p,  - *crisis  dummy  -0.067  0.102
A2 m,  -5  0.061*  0.029  A
2m,  - *crisis  dummy  0.155*  0.062
A2
m  - 6  0.088  *  0.036  A
2
m,  - 6 *crisis  dummy  0.169*  0.075
A2m, - 7  0.065  0.036  A2m,  7 *crisis  dummy  0.227**  0.072
A
2
mI  - 8  0.023  0.036  A2m,  8 *crisis dummy  0.137  *  0.06
A2
2 m1 9  0.021  0.028  A
2
m-  9 *crisis dummy  0.053  0.05
Ay,  - 4  0.025  0.018  Ay, - *crisis dummy  0.049  0.059
Al0 0.001*  0.0003  A1 0 *crisis dummy  0.001  0.001
Al 0
3*  -0.001  0.0003  A1°  3 *crisis dummy  0.0004  0.001
A1'  -0.0002  0.0003  AI-  s *crisis dummy  -0.001  0.001
Au, - 1  -0.04**  0.013  Au, _  1*crisis dummy  -0.145  *  0.063
Au, - 2  0.052**  0.014  Au1 2 *jcrisis  dummy  0.114  0.065
A?4-3  0.041 *  |  0.017  i  - 3 *crisis  dummy  -0.007  0.064
Au, - 6 -0.017  0.015  Au,  6 *crisis dummy  -0.125*  0.052
AU,  - 7 0.033 **  0.012  Au, - 7 *crisis dummy  0.109  0.064
A2w,  0.131 **  0.032  A2w, *crisis dummy  0.049  0.055
A 
2 W, _  0.069 *  0.027  A
2 W,  _  *crisis dummy  0.131 *  0.051
Ae,  -0.184  0.094  Ae, *crisis dummy  0.205  0.127
Ae, - 0.002  0.099  Ae,  , *crisis dummy  0.090  0.108
Ap,*  1.555 **  0.449  Ap*,  *crisis dummy  -0.997  1.857
AI*  0.006  0.003  **isis  dummy  -0.0001  0.005
A1I,*  9  -0.000  0.003  AJ 1*  9 *crisis dummy  0.004  0.005
uruECMrPPP,- 1 -0.001  0.009  uruECMrPPPt-I*crisis dummy  -0.009  0.013
uruECMuip,-1  0.001 **  0.0002  uruECMuip,-,  *crisis dummy  -0.001 *  0.0003
uruECMrM2, - 0.013  0.009  uruECMrM2,  ,*crisis  dummy  0.004  0.0053
uruECMrwage  t - 1 0.022  0.029  uruECMrwage  t  1 *crisis dummy  0.036  0.041
tCrisis dummy equals one for the period 1981(7) - 1985(12)  and it is zero otherwise.
*  Denotes significance at the 5% level.
**  Denotes significance at the 1% level.Data appendix
CHILE
Data Sample: August  1977-  November 1993
List of variables:
m=log of broad money (M2)
p=log of CPI prices
y=log of industrial production
10= interest rate on deposits from 30 to 89 days
p*=log of US prices
i*=US 6 months CD rate
e= Peso/Dollar exchange rate
w=log of wage index
u= log of unemployment rate
sp=share price index
Data frequency and data sources:
Monthly:  -exchange rate (Pesos/US$), M2, Chilean consumer price Index, US consumer price index, US 6 months CD rate, interest rate on deposits from 30 to 89
days, and share price index. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
-unemployment rate. Source: UN  Monthly Bulletin.
Quarterly: -industrial production and wage index. Source Central Bank of Chile.
COLOMBIA
Data sample: January 1981-June 1998
List of variables:
m=log of broad money (M2)
p=log of CPI prices
y=log of industrial production
10= average interest rate for 90 day certificates of deposits
p*=log of US prices
i*=US 6 months CD rate
e= Peso/Dollar exchange rate
w=log of wage index
u= log of unemployment rate
sp=share price index
Data frequency and data sources:
Monthly:  -exchange rate (Pesos/US$), Colombian consumer price index, US consumer prices index, US 6 months CD rate, and share price index.
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
- M2 and interest rate for 90 day certificates of deposit. Source: Central Bank Monthly Bulletin.
-industrial production and wage index. Source: Central Bank sources and DANE monthly bulletin.
Quarterly: -unemployment rate. Source: Central Bank and DANE monthly bulletin.
DENMARK
Data sample: January 1976-December 1993
List of variables:
m=log of broad money (M2)
p=log of CPI prices
y=log of industrial production
1°=  average deposit rate
1a=  bond rate
p*=log of German prices
i*= German bond rate.
e= Krone/Deutsche Mark exchange rate
w=log of wage index
u= log of unemployment rate
Data frequency and data sources:
Monthly:  -exchange rate (Krone/Deutsche Mark), M2, industrial production, Danish consumer price  index, German Consumer  Prices Index, Danish deposit
interest rate, Danish govemment bond yield, and German govemment bond yield. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
-unemployment rate and wage index. Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
JAPAN
Data sample: February 1977-December 1997
List of variables:
m=log of broad money
p=log of CPI prices
y=log of industrial production
I°= average CD rate
V= gensaki rate
1= 10 year bond rate
l*= US bond rate
p*=log of US prices
l*= US bond rate.
e= Yen/Dollar exchange rate
w=log of wage index
u= log of unemployment ratesp=share price index
Data frequency and data sources:
Monthly:  -exchange rate (Yen/US$), Japanese consumer price index, US consumer price index, industrial production, US government bond yield,
and share price index. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
-M2+CDs, Gensaki rate, CD rate, 1  0-year govemment bond, and nominal wage. Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators.
KENYA
Data sample: December 1975-December 1997
List of variables:
m= log of broad money
p= log of CPI prices
y= log of annually interpolated GDP
1°=  average rate on deposits from 2 to 6 months
1= 90 day t-bill rate
I*= US 6 months CD rate
p*= log of US prices
e= Shilling/Dollar exchange rate
Data frequency and data sources:
Monthly:  -exchange rate (Shillings/USS), M2, Kenyan consumer price index, US consumer price index, interest rate on deposits from 2 to 6 months,
and 90-day treasury bill rate. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
Annual:  -GDP. Source: International Financial Statistic (IMF).
MALAYSIA
Data sample: June 1979-December 1996
List of variables:
m=log of broad money
p=log of CPI prices
y=log of industrial production
1°= 3-month deposit interest rates for commercial banks
1= 3-month deposit interest rates for financial institutions
1*= US 6 months CD rate
p*=log of US prices
e= Ringgit/Dollar exchange rate
Data frequency and data sources:
Monthly  -exchange rate (Ringgit/US$), M2, Malaysian consumer price index, US consumer price index, industrial production, and 3-month deposit interest rates
for commercial banks. Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF)
- 3-month deposit interest rates for financial institutions. Source: Central Bank monthly bulletin.
URUGUAY
Data sample: August 1981-December 1997
List of variables:
m=log of broad money
p=log of CPI prices
y=log of industrial production
1°=  interest rate on one to six months deposits:
1*= US 6 months CD rate
p*=log of US prices
e= Peso/Dollar exchange rate
w= log of wages
u= log of the unemployment rate
Monthly:  -exchange rate (Pesos/US$),  M2, Uruguayan consumer price  index, and interest rate  on  I to  6  months deposirs.Source: International  Financial
Statistics (IMF).
-wage index. Source: Central bank bulletin.
Quarterly: -unemployment rate. Source: CEPAL "Economic Survey
-industrial production. Source: Central bank bulletin.TABLE A.1 - Description of the Causes and Consequences  of Banking Crises
Country  Crsis  Causes  Scope of crisis  TOtQl  lOSS  Consequencesfor monetary policy
Chile  1981-87  *  deep recession in 1981  In period 1981-83,  the authorities  Central bank's  . Significant rise in inflation (from 9.5% in
*  exchange rate crisis in 1982  intervened in 13 banks and 6  operational losses  1981 to 26.5% in 1985), due to unsterilized
*  deficient financial organization of the  nonbank financial institutions (with  reached 18% of GDP  financing of massive support programs.
oligopolistic banking system  78% of outstanding loans). 19% of  in 1985.  Inflation remained above 10% until 1994.
*  unsustainable private financial deficits  loans were nonperforming at the end  . Increase in level and volatility of money
of 1983.  multiplier at the beginning of crisis.
Colombia  1982-88  *  banking system suffering from  The authorities intervened in 6 banks  Estimated loss is  n.a.
structural weaknesses  and 8 finance companies. 15%  of  approximately 5% of
*  strong deterioration in terms of trade in  loans were nonperforming in 1984-  GDP
1981  85. In 1985-86, some insolvent
banks were nationalized.
Denmark  1987-92  *  deep recession in the latter part of the  Loan losses over 1990-92  n.a.  n.a.
1980s  represented 9% of loans. 40 of the 60
. rapid increase in monetary aggregates  problem banks were merged.
due to financial liberalization.
Japan  1992-  *  Uncontrolled financial liberalization  Problem loans reprcsented 9% of  Rescue costs  . Rise in bank intermediation spreads
present  fostering sharp asset price inflation  GDP in 1996.  probably higher than  . Easing of monetary policy prompted by the
*  Expansionary monetary policy reflected  US$100bn.  necessity to foster economic growth
in low interest rates, followed by
significant tightening in the proximity
of crisis
*  Sharp economic slowdown and falling
asset prices at the beginning of crisis
n.a. means that the information is not available.TABLE A.1 - Description of the Causes and Consequences of Banking Crises, Continued
Country  Crisis  Causes  Scope of crisis  Total loss  Consequencesfor  monetary  policy
period
Kenya  1985-89  *  Extremely high growth in the number  66% of loans of one third of the  Approximate losses of  . Provision of large amounts of credit to distressed
1993-95  of financial institutions in the 1980s,  commercial banks were  failed local banks  banks was a major source of monetary expansion
with very low regulatory barriers to  nonperforming.  estimated at Ksh 9 bln  and inflation, undermining macroeconomic
entry and low minimum capital  Between 1984 and 1989, 2 local banks  or $158 million.  stability in Kenya in 1992/3.
requirements  and 10 non-bank financial institutions  . Depositors moved their money to more established
. Extensive insider lending, often to  (NBFIs) were closed or taken over.  In  The 1993 frauds cost  banks, which have had to lower their interest rates
politicians; gross mismatch between  1993/4, an additional 5 banks and 10  the Central Bank of  to absorb the sudden excess liquidity.
maturities of assets and liabilities  NBFIs were taken over by the Central  Kenya total of Ksh
. Huge frauds in 1993, involving 3  Bank of Kenya, with 2 more local  10.2 bn or 3.2% of
Kenyan banks  banks in 1996.  1993 GDP.
*  Heavy reliance on deposits from
parastatals
. Reliance on deposits from construction
companies working on govemment
projects which receive their money all
at once after the budget is approved.
Malaysia  195-88  X  Financial liberalization in the early 80s,  Nonperforming loans represented 32%  Reported losses  . Re-imposition of controls on interest rates during
spurring credit growth and price bubble  of total loans in 1988.  equivalent to 4.7% of  1985-87.
. Terms of trade deterioration in 1985-  As of August 1986, 24 deposit taking  GNP.  . Flight to quality and cash
86, which induced the bubble burst  cooperatives were suspended;  *  Rise in money multiplier at the beginning of the
. Annual growth plummeted from 7%  to  depositors have been able to recover  crisis
negative 1% in 1985 and 0% in 1986;  just 1/5 of their deposits.  . Decrease in  reserve and liquidity requirements
collateral shrunk in value below the  with the purpose of reducing banks cost of funds
loan amount it is meant to secure
. Declining deposits,  shrinking loan
demand, sporadic and chockingly-tight
liquidity
•  Almost all Malaysian banks
overexposed to the country's weakest
sector: real estate
Uruguay  1981-87  . Deep world economy recession starting  11%  of loans were nonperforming in  Estimated costs of  n.a.
in 1980s  1986.  recapitalizing banks
. Collapse of the existing exchange rate  estimated at US$350
system, and sharp devaluation  million (7% of GNP).
*  High lcvels of debt in foreign currency
and soaring intemational interest rates  _
n.a. means that the information is not available.
Sources: Brownbridge(1998), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Dominioni and Licandro (1989), Geraghty (1987), Hausmann and Rojas-Suarez. (1996), Koskenkyla (1994),  1indgren,  Garcia, and Saal (1996),
Machua (1986), Mbitiru (1986), Sheng, (1996), and Sundararajan and Balino (1991).TABLE A.2 - Review of Money Demand and Inflation Studies
COUNTRY/A  UTHORS  DESCRIPTION
CHILE
Matte and Rojas (1989)  This study estimates a reduced form money demand equation for a modified measure of MI  commonly used in Chile,
MIA, for the period 1978-86.  The purpose of this exercise is to explain the sudden drop in money demand
experienced by Chile in 1984.  This study does not use cointegration analysis. The demand for real MIA  is modeled as
a function of prices, output, and the average deposit rate (the outside rate of money). Lags of money, output, and the
deposit rate are significant in explaining money demand.
Apt and Quiroz (1992)  Using cointegration analysis and error correction modeling, this paper estimates a monthly money demand function
for MIA  in Chile during 1983:1-1992:8.  The demand for real MIA is modeled as a function of prices, output, and the
average deposit rate (the outside rate of money). The change in the exchange rate is also included as a determinant of
money demand. The fnal  dynamic equation obtained is stable.
Herrera  and Vergara (1992)  Using cointegration analysis and error correction modeling, this study finds a stable long-run money demand function
(MIA) for the period 1978:1-1991:1.
Martner and Titleman  (1993)  This study analyzes the relationship between the real money demand (MIA), short-term interest rates (on deposits
from 30 to 89 days), the price level (CPI), and real income (GDP) for the period 1975-1991. The cointegration
analysis based on Johansen's method shows the existence of a stable long-run relationship for money (one
cointegrating vector).
COLOMBIA
Kamas (1995)  This paper investigates monetary policy effects under crawling peg in Colombia, during 1975-89. A five variable
VAR is estimated. The variables included are: domestic credit, foreign reserves, exchange rate, prices, and income
(proxied by industrial production). The results reveal that neither domestic credit nor the exchange rate appear to have
played much of a role in determining inflation. Inflation seems to be largely inertial and the result of demand shocks.
Rei-nnhack  ~and  Mondino(l ~988) This paper estimates a money demand equation for the period 1977-1985.  The variables included in this study are:
narrow money, interest rate on 90 day certificate of deposit, exchange rate, CPI, and real GDP.
Reinhart and Reinhart (1991)  The authors estimate a VAR of output (real GDP), prices (cpi), monetary aggregates, interest rates on 90 day deposits,
the exchange rate, general and minimum wages for manufacturing employees, and export coffee prices. Results
indicate that money is exogenous, and past fluctuations in inflation, money growth, and exchange rate help predict the
exchange rate. In the end, authors settle for a 6 variable system using growth rates of narrow money, real income
(GDP), consumer prices (CPI), average wages in manufacturing, nominal exchange rate, and the level of nominal
interest rate. According to this model, monetary policy explains a large share of the variability in inflation, wages, and
the exchange rate.
Herrero and Julio (1993)  This study finds evidence of cointegration  between MI, CPI, GDP, and interest rates during 1955-91 and 1970-92.
The results show that money demand is stable. Tests are performed with annual and quarterly data, respectively.
Fullerton (1993)  This paper uses an ARMA process to study inflation in Colombia during 1967-1990. The variables used are: MI,
exchange rate, and CPI. The paper provides evidence that MI and exchange rates can affect inflation.TABLE A.2 - Review of Money Demand and Inflation Studies
DENMARK
Juselius (1988)  This paper finds one cointegrating  vector reflecting a long-run money demand function for period the 1974:1 to 1985:4.
The variables used are real M2, domestic real demand for goods and services, bond rate, and the deposit rate.
Juselius (1998)  Using recently developed statistical  tools for analyzing cointegrated 1(2)  data, this article models money (M2), income,
prices, and interest rates in Demnark. The final model describes the dynamic adjustment to short-run changes of the
process, to deviations from long-run steady states, and to several political interventions.
The error correction model obtained for real M2 is stable.
JAPAN
Corker (1990)  This paper estimates a demand function for broad money in Japan that explains secular trends in the income velocity of
broad money during the 1970s and 1980s and the acceleration in the decline of velocity during 1986-1988. The paper
concludes that wealth effects and the opportunity cost of holding broad money can explain the developments in velocity.
Frowen and Buscher (1990)  This paper estinates  money demand functions for three alterative  monetary aggregates: Ml,  M2, and M2C (which
includes CDs in addition to M2). All monetary aggregates are deflated using CPI. The sample period is 1973:1  to 1987:4.
Other variables included are: Real GDP, call money rate, Gensaki rate, and Kokusai-rate. The authors implement both a
partial adjustment as well as a cointegration and error correction modeling framework. For MI there is evidence of
cointegration, while for M2 the evidence is ambiguous.
Hsiao and Fujiki (1998)  This study compares results from a cointegration analysis with those from a structural modeling of money demand. The
data covers the period 1963:3-1993:1. The variables used are: M2+CDs, real GNP, and nominal call rate. The monetary
aggregate and income measure appear to be cointegrated. The error-correction model does not improve on the ADL
approach.
Arize and Shwiff (1993)  The authors estimate a money demand function for Japan for the period 1973:1-1988:4  using M2, real GNP, 3-month
Gensaki, weighted average of the interest rate on three-month certificates of deposits, the guideline three month deposit
rate, real wealth, and the real exchange rate. The variables are 1(1)  and the results show the existence of one cointegrating
vector. Money demand appears stable.
Yoshida (1990)  This paper estimates an error correction money demand function for the period: 1968:1-1989:1. The variables used in this
study are: real M2+CDs, real GNP, the coupon rate on 5-year debentures, and the coefficient of variation of Nikkei stock
average. One cointegrating relation is found between money and real income. Money demand appears stable.
Soejima (1996)  Using data from the period 1957:3  to 1994:1,  the author studies whether there is a long-run relationship between real
GDP,  money supply (MI), and the price level. This study concludes that real and nominal GDP series can be seen as
stationary processes around a deterministic trend with structural change, while Ml  is non-stationary. The study indicates
that the cointegration between the three variables, which previous studies found, arises from a mispecification of the time
[-.._______________________________  series model,  and  that the instability  in the demand  function  arises  from  the non-stationarity  of MI.TABLE A.2 - Review of Money Demand and Inflation Studies, Continued
Arize (1990)  This study estimates a money demand function for the periods 1973:2-1981:4 and 1973:2-1986:4  using OLS in a setup of
real adjustment analysis. The variables used are: real Ml, domestic real income, bond yield rate, and a number of dummy
variables. The split in the sample is used to determine the stability of the model after the fnancial  innovation period. No
evidence of structural change is found.
Hoffmaister and Schinasi  This paper estimates a VAR of call money rate, growth of M2, real output gap, land price inflation, and the CPI over the
(1994)  period 1986-1993.  The study finds monetary factors are the most important variables behind asset price inflation. With
respect to the CPI, it seems that the capacity of monetary factors to influence the consumer price level has decreased due
to structural  changes.
Sekine (1998)  This paper examines the demand for broad money in Japan from 1975 to 1994. In spite of the large shocks due to the
process of financial liberalization and the subsequent "bubble" economy of the 1990s, the paper confirms that a stable
money  demand  function  can be found by taking  proper  account of the financial  liberalization  and the wealth  effects.
MALAYSIA
Habibulla (1990)  This study tests whether wealth is a better proxy for the scale variable than current income for the Malaysian money
demand. The sample period analyzed is: 1960-1984. The variables employed in this study are: Ml, M2, M3, GNP
deflated by CPI, 3-month T-bill rate, rate of return on the monetary aggregates of interest, and the growth rate of CPI.
After using a partial adjustment mechanism to specify the models, the authors conclude that the scale variable should be
defined in terms of permanent income rather than current income.
Dhakal and Kandil (1993)  T  _iis  paper tests the hypothesis  that inflation is a monetary phenXomenonfor  a group of Asian countries. The model
includes the following variables: CPI, Ml, industrial production index, money market interest rates, unit value of imports,
and foreign nominal interest rates. The results of OLS estimations  for Malaysia show that changes in money supply are
important and significant in predicting prices.
Abdullah and Yusop (1996)  This paper investigates  the causal relationship between money supply and inflation during the period 1970-92. The
variables used are: Ml, M2 and the inflation rate(CPI). After applying Granger methodology, results reveal that money
supply causes  inflation  independently  of the monetary  aggregate  used.
Yusoff (1988)  This paper estimates six behavioral equations with the purpose of analyzing the effects of monetary policy on inflation,
balance of payments (BOP), and real output. The sample covers the period 1960-1981. The method of estimation is 2SLS
and non-linear 3SLS. The equation for inflation posits that inflation is a function of changes in money and changes in
foreign prices.  Both factors appear  to be significant  in the model.
Chye and Semudram  The objective  of this study is to appraise the monetarist and neo-keynesian hypotheses in their ability to predict inflation
in Malaysia. The paper covers the period: 1960-1986. The models employed were estimated by OLS and showed support
for the monetarist view of inflation.
KENYA  . . _
Page (1993)  This study estimates an equation relating inflation to income and money supply (M2) and an equation representing money
demand as a function of past income, expected inflation, and the T-bill rate. T  he money demand function for MI appears
to be stable.TABLE  A.2 - Review of Money Demand and Inflation Studies, Continued
Ndung'u (I 997)  This paper estimates a VAR with money, the domestic price level, the exchange rate index, foreign price index, real
output, and the interest rate. The period analyzed is 1970-1993. One cointegration relationship is found among the
exchange rate, CPI, and foreign prices. Causality tests indicate that exchange rate changes and domestic rate of inflation
changes predict each other. The world rate of inflation does not predict the domestic rate of inflation. Tests for inflation
show a structural break in 1982,  when the crawling peg exchange rate was adopted.
Chakrabarti (1992)  This study aims at investigating  the influence of various factors on inflation in Kenya. The sample period is: 1972-1989,
and the variables employed are: CPI, World Bank's manufacturing unit value index (as  a proxy for world price),
exchange rate, money per unit of output, nominal interest rate on savings deposits, wage variables, lagged CPI, oil price,
and the government budget deficit. The empirical framework is OLS. The monetary aggregate used is M2. Aside from
other results, this study verifies that both the stock of money and exchange rate changes influence prices.
Adam (1992)  This paper studies money demand in the period 1973-1990.  The variables included are: GNP adjusted for changes in
terms of trade, GNP adjusted for changes in total final expenditures,  CPI, T-bill rate, official exchange rate vis a vis the
US dollar, and narrow money. Using a general to specific modeling approach with the ECM term included, the study
finds one cointegrating vector between income and money.
Adam (1992)  This study covers the period: 1972-1990.  VAR is estimated for each of 5 monetary aggregates, plus income, inflation, T-
bill interest, and exchange rate depreciation. The results indicate the existence of two cointegration vectors, one
representing a money demand function and the other a relationship between interest rates and inflation. Using recursive
estimation, the author confirms money demand stability.
Ndung'u (1993)  This paper investigates the determinants of inflation in the period 1970-91. The variables used are: monetary base, real
gross national income, and the annualized treasury discount rate. Two cointegrating vectors are found and the estimation
of an ECM model shows that money supply affects inflation, but not money demand. In the second stage, the model
employed allows for an open economy. The variables added are the nominal exchange rate and the foreign price index.
Three cointegrating relationships are found: a money demand function, a purchasing power parity function, and a third
vector, which is not identifiable.
Mwega and Killick (1990)  This study performs OLS regressions of changes in the CPI on the growth of real income, changes in money supply (M2),
changes in import prices, and changes in previous year's inflation rate. The estimation periods are 1971-82 and 1971-88,
respectively. The authors also estimate a short-run money demand function for 1973:3-1988:4, using Ml, M2 and M3 as
monetary aggregates. The results show that the government may be able to influence demand for money by shifting
interest rates. Money demand functions were found to be stable, but more so for narrow money that for broader
aggregates.
Darrat (1985)  This paper estimates money demand equations for Ml and M2 during 1969-78 using as variables: real GNP, CPI, and an
average of quarterly short-term interest rates in major OECD countries. Money demand functions are found to be stable.
URUGUAY
Graziani (1988)  This paper tests an inflation model where inflation is modeled as a function of lagged money, output, interest rates,
export, and  im.port  prices  The sample  perind  rnncidrepd  is 1952198  Ind  the  metthod  of estimation  is OT  S. Money  and
import prices  seem  to have the  largest effect  on inflation.Table A.3:  Unit Root Tests
Country  Variable  t-adf  beta  sigma  lag  t-prob  F-prob
Chile  m  -2.724  0.966  0.029  3.000  0.001  0.079
p  -2.061  0.976  0.008  1.000  0.000  0.386
y  -2.071  0.919  0.039  12.000  0.063  0.081
w  -4.374**  0.899  0.022  10.000  0.001  0.1189
u  -1.557  0.975  0.070  0.000  - 0.5223
e  -0.889  0.993  0.022  1.000  0.000  0.3969
i°  -5.495**  0.705  8.805  0.000  - 0.3034
m-p  -2.109  0.974  0.029  3.000  0.000  0.194
w-p  -2.532  0.928  0.026  1.000  0.006  0.187
p-e  -1.223  0.990  0.021  1.000  0.000  0.577
dm  -5.288**  0.392  0.029  2.000  0.001  0.223
dp  -7.596**  0.488  0.008  0.000  - 0.465
dy  -2.918  -0.423  0.038  13.000  0.002  -
dw  -2.508  0.387  0.022  9.000  0.028  0.140
du  -12.982**  -0.003  0.071  0.000  - 0.666
de  -7.037**  0.543  0.022  0.000  - 0.507
di°  -12.680**  -0.365  9.175  1.000  0.000  0.199
d(m-p)  -9.953**  -0.180  0.027  1.000  0.781  0.056
d(w-p)  -17.310**  -0.223  0.024  0.000  - 0.346
d(p-e)  -7.467**  0.499  0.021  0.000  - 0.764
d 2m  -8.735**  -3.821  0.029  6.000  0.012  0.317
d 2p  -8.589**  -1.801  0.009  5.000  0.012  0.727
Colombia  m  -2.103  0.971  0.013  12.000  0.007  0.198
p  -2.100  0.983  0.006  11.000  0.017  0.213
y  -2.336  0.869  0.033  2.000  0.001  0.389
e  -0.426  0.998  0.014  1.000  0.000  0.204
io  -3.423  0.913  1.119  3.000  0.002  0.181
w  -1.437  0.961  0.014  13.000  0.001  -
u  -1.456  0.917  0.074  0.000  - 0.569
m-p  -1.751  0.975  0.015  1.000  0.001  0.252
w-p  -2.223  0.919  0.016  12.000  0.000  0.139
p-e  -1.062  0.995  0.014  1.000  0.000  0.578
dm  -3.848*  0.281  0.013  11.000  0.014  0.155
dp  -3.005  0.578  0.006  9.000  0.079  0.082
dy  -15.794**  -0.942  0.033  1.000  0.000  0.157
de  -9.59**  0.326  0.014  0.000  - 0.259
di'  -9.769**  0.274  1.161  0.000  - 0.140
dw  -2.580  -0.306  0.014  12.000  0.001  0.053
du  -8.539**  -0.078  0.073  0.000  - 0.827
d(m-p)  -10.519**  0.230  0.015  0.000  - 0.356
d(w-p)  -3.452*  -0.518  0.016  11.000  0.000  0.410
d(p-e)  -9.221**  0.360  0.015  0.000  - 0.656
For each variable the columms report the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) statistic on the final equation (t-adf),
the estimated coefficient on the lagged level that is being tested for a unit value (beta), the estimated equation
standard error (sigma), the lag length of the ADF regression (tag), the tail probability on the longest lag of the final
regression (t-prob), and the tail probability of the F-statistic for the lags dropped (F-prob).
Rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root is denoted by * and ** forthe 5% and 1%  levels.
Definition of variables:  m is a measure of broad money,p  refers to the CPI, y is a measure  of
output, w is a measure of wages, u is a measure of the unemployment rate, e is the exchange rate
(usually in termns  of domestic currency per US$),i° represents the own rate of  m2, iA represents the
alternative  (outside) rate, i  represents the foreign interest rate. All variables except interest rates are in logs.
Notation: d refers to the change in the variable. dZ  refers to the second difference of a variable.Table A.3:  Unit Root Tests, continued
Country  Variable  t-adf  beta  sigma  lag  t-prob  F-prob
Dennark  m  -1.739  0.981  0.013  12.000  0.005  0.198
p  -1.304  0.995  0.004  0.000  - 0.644
y  -2.787  0.881  0.028  1.000  0.000  0.127
e(kr/dm)  -2.076  0.980  0.007  1.000  0.001  0.2445
p*(german)  -1.284  0.993  0.003  1.000  0.000  0.0576
i°  -1.484  0.978  0.327  0.000  - 0.082
iA  -2.770  0.951  0.543  12.000  0.005  0.489
i*(german  ib)  -2.773  0.963  0.231  11.000  0.008  0.395
w  -1.294  0.988  0.007  12.000  0.008  0.894
u  -3.749*  0.935  0.030  12.000  0.000  0.066
m-p  -2.357  0.971  0.014  12.000  0.005  0.469
w-p  -0.855  0.983  0.008  11.000  0.033  0.162
p-e  -1.527  0.969  0.009  0.000  - 0.591
dm  -2.378  0.450  0.013  11.000  0.010  0.545
dp  -12.090**  0.123  0.004  0.000  - 0.842
dy  -13.628**  -0.618  0.028  1.000  0.005  0.153
de(kr/dm)  -10.710**  0.232  0.008  0.000  - 0.274
dp  (german)  -9.408**  0.358  0.003  0.000  - 0.180
di"  -11.774**  0.195  0.317  0.000  - 0.687
diA  -4.408**  0.112  0.553  11.000  0.002  0.227
di*(german)  -9.314**  0.392  0.236  0.000  - 0.286
dw  -3.787*  -0.336  0.007  11.000  0.005  0.347
du  -2.688  0.479  0.030  12.000  0.003  0.796
d(m-p)  -2.350  0.484  0.014  11.000  0.005  0.777
d(w-p)  -5.675**  -1.110  0.008  10.000  0.026  0.196
d(p-e)  -11.974**  0.125  0.009  0.000  - 0.709
d2m2  -6.669**  -6.516  0.014  10.000  0.000  0.466
d2p  -8.265**  -5.683  0.004  10.000  0.003  0.651Table A.3: Unit Root Tests,  continued
Country  Variable  t-adf  beta  sigma  lag  t-prob  F-prob
Japan  m  -0.593  0.997  0.006  13.000  0.001  -
p  -2.611  0.980  0.004  12.000  0.008  0.720
y  -1.904  0.973  0.013  9.000  0.000  0.597
e  -2.466  0.964  0.029  11.000  0.035  0.856
Sp  -0.656  0.995  0.039  9.000  0.027  0.348
iA  -2.882  0.968  0.286  3.000  0.000  0.109
;°  -2.518  0.969  0.315  2.000  0.064  0.068
ib(1yOrOECD)  -3.150  0.925  0.373  0.000  - 0.164
w  -2.127  0.917  0.018  13.000  0.004  -
u  -0.852  0.986  0.033  2.000  0.000  0.434
m-p  -0.934  0.993  0.007  13.000  0.020  -
w-p  -1.855  0.838  0.019  13.000  0.005  -
p-e  -2.279  0.962  0.029  11.000  0.037  0.839
dm  -2.474  0.508  0.006  13.000  0.009  -
dp  -2.525  0.514  0.004  11.000  0.014  0.370
dy  -3.209  0.276  0.013  8.000  0.001  0.320
de  -10.513**  0.336  0.029  0.000  - 0.377
dsp  -4.279**  0.293  0.039  11.000  0.048  0.624
diA  -4.815**  0.560  0.288  4.000  0.020  0.108
dio  -9.341**  0.452  0.324  0.000  - 0.062
dib(1OyrOECD)  -14.481**  0.053  0.382  0.000  - 0.130
dw  -3.997*  -2.657  0.018  13.000  0.009  -
du  -15.957**  -0.527  0.033  1.000  0.000  0.422
d(m-p)  -2.489  0.551  0.007  13.000  0.004  -
d(w-p)  -4.214**  -3.212  0.018  13.000  0.022  -
d(p-e)  -10.679**  0.322  0.029  0.000  - 0.330
2 d2m  -5.893**  -7.453  0.006  12.000  0.002  0.961
d2P  -8.242**  -7.059  0.004  10.000  0.002  0.722
Kenya  m  -0.694  0.992  0.024  12.000  0.007  0.860
p  -1.462  0.990  0.015  3.000  0.000  0.619
y  -2.015  0.980  0.007  0.000  - 0.937
e  -3.276  0.965  0.028  5.000  0.005  0.238
j°  -3.420  0.947  0.783  2.000  0.000  0.211
A  -4.334**  0.893  2.093  11.000  0.003  0.871
i* (US)  -2.838  0.954  0.552  13.000  0.004  -
m-p  -2.502  0.945  0.027  12.000  0.004  0.365
p-e  -2.567  0.917  0.034  12.000  0.007  0.449
dm  -3.796*  0.162  0.024  11.000  0.011  0.411
dp  -3.208  0.545  0.016  13.000  0.047  -
dy  -16.378**  -0.023  0.007  0.000  - 0.876
de  -4.525**  0.574  0.029  4.000  0.019  0.131
di'  -4.647**  0.259  0.794  13.000  0.028  -
diA  -5.719**  0.274  2.195  8.000  0.002  0.090
di* (US)  -4.160**  0.100  0.561  12.000  0.009  0.297
d(m-p)  -7.026**  0.200  0.028  2.000  0.001  0.066
d(p-e)  -6.466**  -0.618  0.034  13.000  0.028  -Table A.3: Unit Root Tests, continued
Country  Variable  t-adf  beta  sigma  lag  t-prob  F-prob
Malaysia  m  0.424  1.004  0.014  0.000  - 0.733
p  -1.909  0.982  0.004  4.000  0.011  0.087
y  -4.253**  0.748  0.045  1.000  0.000  0.265
e  -1.463  0.974  0.010  13.000  0.011  -
i°,  -2.197  0.969  0.386  2.000  0.016  0.123
iA  -2.825  0.944  0.481  10.000  0.001  0.401
i* (US 6m cd)  -2.920  0.934  0.496  13.000  0.000  -
m-p  -0.231  0.997  0.015  0.000  - 0.828
p-e  -0.858  0.989  0.010  13.000  0.004  -
dm  -15.361**  -0.129  0.014  0.000  - 0.891
dp  -2.187  0.674  0.004  13.000  0.018  -
dy  -23.614**  -0.510  0.047  0.000  - 0.078
de  -4.378**  -0.116  0.010  12.000  0.010  0.378
di°  -11.584**  0.184  0.392  0.000  - 0.142
diA  -3.679*  0.300  0.491  9.000  0.005  0.435
di*(US 6m cd)  -3.802*  0.263  0.501  12.000  0.001  0.947
d(m-p)  -15.631**  -0.145  0.015  0.000  - 0.966
d(p-e)  -3.731*  0.211  0.010  12.000  0.003  0.151
d2m  -7.824**  -4.958  0.015  8.000  0.046  0.560
d2p  -6.601**  -5.783  0.004  12.000  0.009  0.178
Uruguay  m  -0.533  0.995  0.031  6.000  0.013  0.100
p  0.066  1.000  0.016  8.000  0.000  0.572
y  -2.938  0.758  0.045  0.000  - 0.326
e  -1.439  0.979  0.057  0.000  - 0.948
i°  -2.162  0.971  2.958  4.000  0.021  0.086
i((US cd rate)  -2.491  0.958  0.328  5.000  0.034  0.128
w  -0.668  0.994  0.028  8.000  0.000  0.735
u  -2.814  0.648  0.099  0.000  - 0.071
m-p  -2.634  0.926  0.038  0.000  - 0.315
w-p  -3.747*  0.894  0.024  4.000  0.000  0.389
p-e  -5.666**  0.853  0.053  0.000  - 0.627
dm  -3.657*  0.463  0.032  4.000  0.016  0.079
dp  -2.608  0.752  0.016  7.000  0.000  0.653
dy  -10.690**  -0.352  0.045  0.000  - 0.979
de  -13.792**  -0.059  0.058  0.000  - 0.819
dio  -7.063**  0.260  2.981  3.000  0.012  0.102
di*(US cd)  -8.905**  0.388  0.332  0.000  - 0.202
dw  -2.586  0.678  0.027  7.000  0.000  0.797
du  -9.967**  -0.452  0.098  0.000  - 0.136
d(m-p)  -13.846**  -0.062  0.039  0.000  - 0.236
d(w-p)  -4.842**  0.172  0.025  3.000  0.000  0.304
d(p-e)  -14.772**  -0.128  0.057  0.000  - 0.982
d2m2  -6.717**  -7.383  0.031  10.000  0.043  0.900
d2p  -10.483**  -3.628  0.016  6.000  0.000  0.483Table A.4- Cointegration Results: Lag Length Selection and Eigenvalue Statistics - MONETARY  SECTOR
Maximal Eigenvalue  Eigenvalae Trace
Statistic,  StaJlstic
Selected  System  Ho:  Statisti  adjustedfor  95%  critical  S  adjustedfor  95% critical
Lag Length  Rank=p  degrees  of  value  S  degrees of  value
freedom  freedom
Chile  3  p=O  70.46**  65.81**  31.5  125.6**  117.3**  63.0
p<=l  27.95*  26.11*  25.5  55.12**  51.48**  42.4
p<=2  16.46  15.37  19.0  27.16*  25.37*  25.3
p<=3  10.71  10.00  12.3  10.71  10.00  12.3
Colombia  13  p=O  29.66  21.79  31.5  74.98**  55.09  63.0
p<=l  26.04*  19.13  25.5  45.32*  33.3  42.4
p<=2  13.52  9.93  19.0  19.29  14.17  25.3
p<=3  5.771  4.24  12.3  5.771  4.24  12.3
Denmark  12  p==O  96**  67,49*4  37.5  191**  134.3**  87.3
p<=l  61.35**  43.13**  31.5  94.98**  66.77*  63.0
p<=2  20.09  14.212  25.5  33.63  23.64  42.4
p<=3  10.84  7.622  19.0  13.54  9.515  25.3
p<=
4 2.692  1.893  12.3  2.692  1.893  12.3
Japan  7  p==O  54.74**  46.66**  37.5  119.9**  102.2**  87.3
p<--l  30.65  26.13  31.5  65.21  55.58  63.0
p<=2  22.39  19.09  25.5  34.56  29.45  42.4
p<=3  9.67  8.242  19  12.16  10.37  25.3
p<=4  2.493  2.125  12.3  2.493  2.125  12.3
Kenya  11  p=O  41.12*  32.42  37.5  117.2**  92.41t  87.3
p<=]  32.79*  25.85  31.5  76.08**  59.98  63
p<=2  27.11*  21.38  25.5  43.29*  34.13  42.4
p<=3  12.43  9.798  19  16.18  12.75  25.3
p<=4  3.749  2.956  12.3  3.749  2.956  12.3
Malaysia  3  p=O  56.78**  52.46**  37.5  163**  150.6+*  87.3
p<=l  46.42**  42.88**  31.5  106.3**  98.16**  63.0
p<=2  31.84**  29.41k  25.5  59.83**  55.28**  42.4
p<=3  21.92*  20.25*  19.0  28*  25.86*  25.3
p<=
4 6.074  5.611  12.3  6.074  5.611  12.3
Uruguay  4  p==O  43.22**  39.46**  31.5  76.18**  69.56*  63
p<=l  20.19  18.44  25.5  32.96  30.09  42.4
p<=
2 10.75  9.818  19  12.77  11.66  25.3
p<=3  2.016  1,84  12.3  2.016  1.84  12.3Table A.4 - Cointegration Results: Lag Length Selection and Eigenvalue Statistics - EXTERNAL SECTOR
Maxima!  Eigenvalue  Eigenvalue Trace
Statistic,  Statistic,
Selected  System  Ho:  Statisi  adjustedfor  95%  critical  Statisti  adjustedfor  95% critical
Lag Length  Rank'=p  degrees  of  value  degrees  of  value
freedom  freedom
Chile  5  p==0  43.49**  39.9**  25.5  68.51**  62.86**  42.4
p<=]  23.12*  21.21*  19  25.02  22.96  25.3
p<=2  1.905  1.748  12.3  1.905  1,748  12.3
Colombia  5  p=(0  57.93**  50.54**  37.5  129.9**  113.3**  87.3
p<=l  27.35  23.86  31.5  71.98**  62.8  63
p<=2  21.24  18.53  25.5  44.63  38.94  42,4
p<=3  17.03  14.86  19.0  23.38  20.4  25.3
p<=4.  6.355  5.545  12.3  6.355  5.545  12.3
Denmark  12  p=  0  58.94**  41.43*  37.5  140.5**  98.74**  87.3
p<=  1  32.74*  23.01  31.5  81.52**  57.31  63.0
p <= 2  29.03*  20.4  25.5  48.78*  34.29  42.4
p <= 3  17.83  12.54  19  19.76  13.89  25.3
p<=  4  1.923  1.352  12.3  1.923  1.352  12.3
Japan  6  p=  0  79.87**  69.76**  37.5  167**  145.9**  87.3
p<=  1  51.43**  44.92**  31.5  87.17**  76.13**  63.0
p<=  2  22.23  19.41  25.5  35.74  31.21  42.4
p<=  3  9.764  8.528  19.0  13.51  11.8  25.3
p <=  4  3.747  3.273  12.3  3.747  3.273  12.3
Kenya  12  p=  0  46.41"'  35.7  37.5  123.8**  95.22*  87.3
p<=  1  36.45*  28.04  31.5  77.38**  59.52  63,0
p<=  2  22.31  17.16  25.5  40.93  31.48  42.4
p <= 3  13.46  10.36  19.0  18.62  14.32  25.3
p<=  4  5.161  3.97  12.3  5.161  3.97  12.3
Malaysia  6  p=  0  42.77**  39.19**  25.5  64.94*t  59.51**  42.4
p<=  1  18.58  17.02  19  22.17  20.32  25.3
p<=  2  3.592  3.291  12.3  3.592  3.291  12.3Table A.4 - Cointegration Results: Lag Length Selection and Eigenvalue Statistics - WAGES
Maximal  Eigenvalue  Eigenvalue  Trace
Selected System  Ho:  Statistic,  95% critical  Statistic,  95% critical
Lag Length  Rank=p  d  value  Statistic  adjsted  for  value
Chile  4  p=  0  46.82**  43.73**  25.5  68.42**  63.91**  42.4
p<=  1  15.15  14.15  19  21.6  20.18  25.3
p<=  2  6.457  6.032  12.3  6.457  6.032  12.3
Colombia  2  p  0  29.18*  28.29*  25.5  45.24*  43.85*  42.4
p<=  1  11.12  10.78  19  16.05  15.56  25.3
p <=  2  4.939  4.787  12.3  4.939  4.787  12.3
Denmark  13  p=  0  26.88*  21.69  25.5  50.59**  40.82  42.4
p<=  1  23.31*  18.81  19  23.71  19.13  25.3
p<=  2  0.392  0.3163  12.3  0.392  0.3163  12.3
Japan  13  p=  0  94.87**  79.26**  25.5  120.8**  100.9**  42.4
p<=  I  19.45*  16.25  19  25.89*  21.63  25.3
p-=  2  6.441  5.381  12.3  6.441  5.381  12.3TABLE A.5 - Dummy Variables  Used in the Cointegration  Analysis and Single Equation  Estimations
Country  |Dmmy  Variable  lExplanationforincludingthedummy  Dummy is included in...
Chile  December-79  Dummy controls for redefinition of money.  Monetary sector (MCI), labor
sector (WCI), and extemal
sector (ECI) cointegration
analysis and the money (M)
and price (P) equations (eqn.)
June-82  Dummy controls for exchange rate depreciation.  MCI, WCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
July-82  Dummy controls for exchange rate depreciation.  MCI, WCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
September-84  Dummy controls for exchange rate depreciation.  MCI, WCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
October-84  Dummy controls for exchange rate depreciation.  MCI, WCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
November-84  Following the September 1984 devaluation, the Central Bank  P eqn.
transferred significant amount of resources to commercial
banks.
Colombia  Centered Seasonals  Needed to control for changes in wage seasonality occuring
after 1990.  WCI and P eqn.
Interacted Centered
ISeasonais  Needed to control for changes in wage seasonality occuring
after 1990.
WCI and P eqn.
Denmark  DVAT  DVAT=3 for 1977Q4,  2.25 for 1978Q4, and 1.75 for 1980Q3
This dummy controls for three increases in the value-added ta)
rate.  MCI, WCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
DPRSTOP
DPRSTOP= I for 1978Q4, for 1979QI, for 1979Q4, and for
1980QI. This dummy controls  for 4 periods of price controls. MCI, WCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
DCOTAX  DCOTAX= I for 1979Q3, and for 1986Q2.  This dummy
controls for two cases of special commodity taxes.  MCI, WCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
DUMCAPCON  DUMCAPCON=I for 1983(1) through 1998(2); zero
otherwise; it controls for the removal of capital controls.  MCI and ECI
Oct-77  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
April-78  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
May-78  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
October-78  Controls for unidentified data oudier.  P eqn.
August-80  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
January-83  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
1983Q1  Controls for the time it takes for country to adjust to lifting of
capital controls.  MCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
1983Q2  Controls for the time it takes for country to adjust to lifting of
capital controls.  MCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
April-86  Controls for pressures in the foreign exchange market which  P eqn.
led to a rise in long- and medium-term interest rates, starting ir
the second quarter of 1986.
1992Q4  Controls for speculative attacks in the last quarter of '92.  MCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
December-92  Controls for speculative attacks.  MCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
June-93  Controls for speculative attacks.  MCI, ECI, M, and P eqln.
July-93  Controls for speculative attacks.  MCI, ECI, M, and P eq[n.
August-93  Controls for speculative attacks.  MCI, ECI, M, and P ecln.
Japan  Dmay  Dummy for May 1990, controlling for a shift from postal
savings into M2.  MCI, M, and P eqn.
Dapril  Dummny  for April 1990, controlling for a shift from postal
savings into M2.  MCI, M, and P eqn.
April-89  Dummy controls for VAT increase.  MCI, WCI, ECI, M, and P eqn.
April-97  Dummy controls for VAT increase.  MCI, WCI, ECI, M, arid P eqn.
DjulyT  Dummy controls for bonus payments.  WCI and P eqn.
DJuneT  Dummy controls for bonus payments.  WCI and P eqn.
Notation: MCI, WCI, and ECI indicate that the corresponding dummy was allowed to enter unrestrictedly in the money, labor,
and external sectors cointegration analysis, respectively. M and P indicate that the dummy entered the money and
price equations, respectively.TABLE A.5 - Dummy Variables Used in the Cointegration Analysis and Single Equation Estimations
Country  |Dummy  Variable  Explanation  Dummy  is included  in...
Kenya  February-77  Controls for peak of M2 growth.  MCI, M, and P eqn.
March-77  Controls for peak of M2 growth.  M and P eqn.
February-80  MCI
Controls for unidentified data outlier.
July-81  Dummy controls for drought.  MCI
December-81  Controls for sharp increases in prices due both to the drought  P eqn.
and to the upward adjustment in various administered prices.
March-85  Controls for first in a series of four adjustments in the central  M and P eqn.
exchange rate.
March-88  Dummy controls for tight monetary policy;  Central Bank  MCI and M eqn.
launches an aggressive treasury bond sale program.
May-91  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
March-92  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
June-92  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
February-93  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
March-93  Dummy controls for devaluation.  MCI
April-93  Controls for sharp devaluation in the exchange rate as part of a M and P eqn.
macroeconomic  policy adopted in April 93.
June-93  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  M and P eqn.
October-93  MadPen
Controls for strong foreign exchange inflows around October  M and P eqn.
1993; also, exchange rate was unified on October 17, 1993.
January-94  Controls for accelerating inflation due to surge in monetary  P eqn.
aggregates, drought, and price liberalization.
September-94  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  P eqn.
Malaysia  January-84  Dummy controls for withdrawal of subsidies for fuel.  MCI, ECI, M and P eqn.
February-84  Dummy controls for withdrawal of subsidies for fuel.  MCI, ECI, M and P eqn.
March-84  Dummy controls for withdrawal of subsidies for fuel.  MCI, ECI, M and P eqn.
Uruguay  November-82  Dummy controls for peso float in late November 1982.  MCI, WCI, M, and P eqn.
December-82  Dummy controls for sharp fall in peso value; as a result of the  MCI, WCI, M, and P eqn.
float, the banking system experienced massive withdrawals of
foreign currency deposits.
December-87  Controls for debt-to-debt conversion scheme.  MCI, WCI, M, and P eqn.
January-88  Controls for debt-to-debt conversion scheme.  MCI, WCI, M, and P eqn.
November-89  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  MCI, WCI, M, and P eqn.
December-89  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  MCI, WCI, M, and P eqn.
January-90  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  MCI, WCI, M, and P eqn.
December-92  Controls for unidentified data outlier.  MCI, WCI, M, and P eqn.
Notatioi: MCI, WCI, and ECI indicate that the corresponding dummy was allowed to enter unrestrictedly in the money, labor,
and external sectors cointegration analysis, respectively. M and P indicate that the dummy entered the money and
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